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Abstract 
-~ . 
The thesis focuses on the Primary School Nutrition Programme 
(PSNP), particularly in the Eastern Cape, as a government 
nutrition and education project, and its failure to achieve its 
stated goals. The programme experienced problems armost as soon 
as it was introduced. The press reported incidents of fraud and 
maladministration and the programme was halted and restarted 
numerous times. The thesis seeks to offer some insight as to why 
the government was unable to reach its stated objectives in the 
implementation phase of the programme. State theory informs the 
thesis in an attempt to further explain why .governments often 
seem unable to attain their intended goals. 
The thesis provides an alternative to ~ov~~nment development 
programmes, arguing that NGOs are better equipped to deal with 
the particular problems that people on the ground experjen~ewhen 
dealing with issues like nutritional vulnerability. Operation 
Hunger provides an excellent case study for how development of 
this nature ought to occur. 
The essential argument of the thesis is that there is an inherent 
tension between what a government's stated intentions is and what 
, 
it, in reality, intends to gain from such programmes. It is the 
contention of this thesis that the Government of National Unity 
embarked on the PSNP, not to ensure nutritional development for 
its own sake, but rather to curry favour with its constituents. 
Operation Hunge~, and other organisations like it, provide relief 
to vulnerable communities with no hidaen agenda in mind. Their 
mandate lS solely that they provide assistance. The thesis 
argues, then, that NGOs have a role in domestic and international 
politics, that they can make up for or do better, or at least 
well, things that governments struggle to do. 
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Introduction 
One hundred days after President Mandela took office in South 
Africa, he launched a number of,d.evelopment programmes, in an 
attempt to kick-start the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP). The RDP was a broad policy outline, promising 
development in the previously disadvantaged sectors of the South 
~~ ~ 
African community. For a variety of reasons, almost three months 
after the ANC began its leadership of the Government of National 
Unity (GNU), the RDP's delivery was scant and sporadic. 
The Primary Schools Nutrition Programme was one of these hundred-
day programmes. It was started in the context of an educational 
and nutritional crisis in South Africa, especially in the rural 
area~, where there was no culture of learning and low attendance 
at schools. In terms of nutrition, some estimates held that 33% 
of children in the former-Transkei were stunted and there wer~ 
many other problems of malnutrition, including related diseases. 
In South Africa during the Apartheid era, NGOs like Operation 
Hunger and Gadra, were at the forefront of trying to alleviate 
these problems. Once South Africa's government was legitimised 
by the general election in 1994, foreign donors began to invest 
in RDP schemes rather than those run by the NGO sector. . -The 
establishment of the PSNP fprther decreased the role of the NGOs 
in this particular area of development. The organisations, with 
their decades of expertise, were informed that their services 
were no longer required and that they would receive no government 
funding for primary school feeding. 
Soon after the implementation of the programme in the Eastern 
Cape, it ran into trouble. Accusations of fraud, theft and 
maladministration were levelled at the regional government and 
the bureaucrats that ran the programme. At one stage feeding was 
hal ted altogether, only to be boosted by further budgetary 
allocations. The programme then once again ground to a halt in 
many schools. After a recent review process, it has been decided 
that the programme should continue, using the expertise of the 
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NGOs. Organisations were asked to tender if they wanted to 
participate. Significantly, perhaps the most experienced NGO of 
". 
all in this fiel-d, Operation Hunge:r::, decided not to tender as it 
is critical of the way in which the government has conceptualised 
and proceeded with the programme. 
The government has at various points alluded to several different 
aims of the programme. One is educational: the idea that by 
offering food at school children would be more likely to attend 
and more able to concentrate one they got there. A second 
possible aim is nutritional: to attempt to alleviate some of the 
problems of malnutrition, particularly in the rural areas. A 
third aim, which was sometimes alluded to, was that of 
development and community empowerment, for example job creation. 
By involving the community in the provision of school meals, jobs 
would be created in the process. ~ 
This study, therefore, seeks to argue that one of the 
difficulties of the PSNP is that there is an inherent tension 
between what a government's stated intentions are and what it in 
reality intends to gain. Governments do not embark on 
development programmes for development's sake, but rather to gain 
favour with their constituents. The thesis will further argue 
that NGOs have a role to pl~y in the development of South Africa 
and they are better equipped to embark on programmes like the 
PSNP. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is d~vided into four chapters. Chapter One provides 
.' 
a description of the PSNP, its historical background and the 
attempts made by the government to address the programme's 
inadequacies. The chapter attempts to reach some conclusions as 
to why the programme did not fulfil the aims and objectives that 
it intended to. 
Chapter Two continues in this vein, offering some theoretical 
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insights into why programmes of this kind fail. The chapter 
argues that there is an inherent tension between government 
policy and development programmes •. This chapter seeks to arrive 
at some conclusion as to why states, indeed, embark on these kind 
of programmes at all, and when they do why they seldom seem to 
do the best job possible. 
Chapter Three provides an alternative to government-managed 
development programmes. The chapter argues that NGOs are better 
equipped to provide these kinds of services. The chapter defines 
what is meant by the term NGO, focuses on the international 
dimension of NGOs, takes into account NGO strengths and 
weaknesses and finally reaches the conclusion that NGOs can often 
perform functions that governments struggle to. 
Chapter Four provides a description of O~er~ion Hunger, as an 
alternative to the PSNP, as an agency that has prov~ded 
nutritional assistance to primary school children- (amongst 
others), for 20 years. The chapter traces the history of the 
organisation, arguing that the strategies used by Operation 
Hunger are far more appropriate for dealing with South Africa's 
nutritional problems. 
4 
CHAPTER ONE 
," 
The Primary School Nutrition Programme 
1.1. Historical Background 
In his State of the Nation address on 24 May 1994 President 
Mandela pledged to implement a nutritional feeding scheme in 
every primary school where such a need was established. His aim 
was to address the imbalances that had been created by Apartheid 
in terms of children's nutritional development. Thus, the 
Primary School Nutrition Programme (PSNP) was implemented on the 
1 September 1994 following this announcement. 'The programme was 
to form part of the 5 100-day projects which the President had 
prioritised in terms of South Africa's development agenda. 
Feeding began in all South African schools soon after the 
announcement of the programme. At the end of the second school 
term of 1995 it was discovered that R67 million of the R113 
million budget for the Eastern Cape PSNP had already been spent. 
This was to be the first of many scandalous discoveries which 
have plagued the programme, especially in the Eastern Cape, since 
its outset. At the start of the third school term the" PSfIP 
collapsed after the "belated discovery of widespread fraud and 
mismanagement" (Arnner, 1995: 32) . The regional government 
suspended the programme in late August because of this discovery. 
It was also decided that a regional nutritional surveillance 
programme be established by nurses in the region (City 
Press,6.8.95) aud that the National Progressive Primary Health 
Care Network (NPPHCN) investigate the programme (WM&G,15-
21.3.96). The programme was to be investigated by a Technical 
Task Team that made recommendations to the RDP standing 
committee. 
In the same week the Weekly Mail and Guardian reported that the 
province had spent its' entire budget for the financial year 
ending April 1996, in just four months. The budget for the year 
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totalled Rl14 million (WM&G, 4 -10.8.95). The director-general of 
the province, Mr Thomazile Botha, admitted at this stage that the 
province had been unprepared for<the PSNP, but argued that the 
criticism levelled at Bisho was unfair, because the national 
government had implemented the programme haphazardly (Saturday 
Star, 12.8.95) . Others, especially the press in the region, 
agreed with Botha that: 
In its enthusiasm for delivering a vote-catching national 
development project at break-neck speed, the national 
government introduced a policy today for implementation 
tomorrow, doing so without adequate provision for an 
enabling process to facilitate implementation (cited in 
Amner,1995:36) . 
The national coordinator of the programme, Ms Diane Kloka, agreed 
that because the programme was a lOa-day project1 , pressure was 
placed on the PSNP to "deliver in haste without any clear sense 
of what was required or how to go about it'~ (WM&G,4-10.8.95). 
President Mandela called for a full audit of the programme in the 
province and, in a press release (7.8.95) the regional gov~~nfuent 
condemned fraud and corruption. 
The fourth term of the year saw a scaled down version of the 
PSNP, this time primary school children only received feeding 
three times a week (Daily Dispatch,15.8.95). By the end of lS95, 
the entire budget was again spent, leaving no funds for the 
remaining school term. Officials running the, PSNP in Bisho 
estimated that a further R53 million was needed before the new 
PSNP budget was granted in April 1996 (Amner, 1995: 32) This 
discovery came in the wake of a survey, conducted by the 
provincial heal~h and welfare department, which indicated that 
the most needy children in the Eastern Cape are from farmi~g and 
resettlement communities. 
When the new school year began in 1996 no feeding commenced, as 
there had been no additional budgetary allocations made to the 
1After President Mandela had been in office for 100 days, 
he prioritised a number of projects, and endorsed them as his 
own. Nutrition, and the subsequent Primary Schools Nutrition 
Programme, was one of these priorities. 
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Eastern Cape. In the seventh week of the school term feeding 
started again, Bisho having been granted R35 million to see them 
.. - ~-, 
through the financial year. Thi5.time, however, only children 
from Sub A to Standard 2 would receive sandwiches (M&G,15-
21.03.96) 
Before the budget for the current financial year was allocated 
an intensive investigation recommended that NGOs that had, in the 
past, been feeding in the region again be brought on board. 2 
Before the start of the PSNP, NGOs were carrying out various 
nutritional functions in the Eastern Cape. When the PSNP began 
its work, organisations like The Grahamstown Area Distress Relief 
Association (GADRA) and Operation Hunger were "thanked for their 
efforts, but told that their services were no longer needed" 
(Amner,1995:35). In the Western Cape, the PSNP was almost 
entirely run by NGOs alone, and in the ~21-schools that were 
invol ved in feeding, only one case of fraud was repor~ed, 
amounting to R4000. At the start of the programme, . Operation 
Hunger offered technical assistance to the programme, but the 
programme administrators continued on their own agenda. 
NGOs in the area were asked to tender to the PSNP and by the end 
of August 1996 the NGOs who would implement the programme-had 
been chosen. They were to begin feeding at the start of the last 
school term of the year, which began 7 October. Reports confirmed 
that there had been no feeding in the Eastern Cape for at least 
2 months. Five NGOs had been contracted to begin their work at 
that time, after being approved by the Tender Board at the end 
of August (EPH,~8.09.96). They are, Eastern Cape Relief Action, 
The Association for Consumer Justice, Daily Bread Charitable 
Trust, The National Educare Forum and The Provincial Council of 
2This, of-course, had been recommended a number of times in 
the history of the programme. It had, indeed, been stated in the 
policy framework of the programme that NGOs had invaluable 
expertise in the field that should be used to the fullest extent. 
Both the Technical Task Team report and that of the NPPHCN, 
recommended that the PSNP was ignoring the knowledge that NGOs 
could impart to it. 
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Churches3 The inclusion of NGOs as the agents of delivery in 
the PSNP has not been without its problems. The programme was 
again suspended -in September 1996".when three of the NGOs failed 
to submit their documents to the regional government 
(EPH, 10 .10.96) . The NGOs chosen to implement the programme 
continued to do so for the rest of the 1996 school year, but most 
..-~ ~ 
admit that they are not feeding 100 percent of the children 
mandated to them (DD,15.10.96). 
1.2. An Appraisal of the PSNP's intentions 
According to the policy framework issued by the national 
government, the programme lies between two development priorities 
in South Africa: the need to improve health, through nutrition, 
and t.he need to improve education. The government argued that 
these challenges needed be seen in the context of the broader 
development task that faces South Africa-..;..The government was 
aware of the fact that extensive work had to be done in the 
nutritional sphere to address the problems of short-term huhger, 
protein deficiency and infection, as well as ensuring that there 
was education around these issues. Indeed, it was the intention 
of the policy-makers to: 
effect long term sustainable improvements in diet and 
nutritional status, nutrition intervention should--be 
linked to nutrition education programmes for children, 
teachers and parents (National Policy Framework and 
Operational Guidelines,1995:2-4). 
The aim of the programme to provide sustainable development, 
through nutritional intervention and education is an admirable 
one, and one 0:1; the most important in improving nutritional 
status, but as yet has been completely ignored in the 
implementation of the programme. The NGOs who tendered to the 
PSNP, did not have to incorporate an education component in their 
tender conditions. The policy framework goes on to comment that 
there is "sufficient evidence to suggest that malnutrition, 
parasitic infection and temporary hunger, ... are primary factors 
3Please see figure 1 for details of the regions of the 
Eastern Cape that the NGOs serve. 
8 
influencing a child's 'active learning capacity'" (1995,2-4). 
-< 
The aims of the programme are thus: firstly, to improve the 
learning capacity of needy and hungry children, to alleviate 
temporary hunger, to educate children around health issues, to 
i"'" ~ ~ 
combat poverty, and "to phase out the provision of food when 
other RDP key activities start showing positive effects" (Policy 
Framework,1995:3-2). It was also intended that there be micro-
nutrient supplementation, parasite eradication, nutrition 
education as part of the prescribed curriculum, and a linking of 
this programm to other development initiatives within the RDP. 
In terms of targeting, the PSNP intended to target needy schools, 
rather than needy pupils within schools-. c.-Within a targeteci 
school, especially those in the rural areas and those serving 
informal settlements, every child was to receive food.' The 
factors to be taken into account when targeting schools were to 
be: unemployment, budgetary constraints, delivery capacity and 
income levels (Policy Framework,1995:4-1). The programme was 
also to ensure that there be an ongoing monitoring process. 
It is clear that with the exception of sporadic temporary hunger 
alleviation, the programme failed to meet its 'own aims. The 
nutritional status of children, with the programme running for 
almost 2 years, has never been evaluated. Nutritional education 
was never embarked upon. Parasitic infection was not dealt with 
and the programme was not linked to other RDP development 
initiatives, except where the government was able to create jobs 
for women living in the targeted communities. This meant that 
there was little or no empowerment in the community and 
sustainable development simply did not occur. 
Why, then, did the government fail to meet the stated objectives 
of the PSNP? One suggestion is that there is a tension between 
the stated objectives of the programme and the 
9 
real reason why government embarks on such a programme, namely, 
to curry favour with its constituency. 
-:; r 
1.3. Key difficulties with the PSNP 
1.3.1. Theft and Corruption 
There were numerous reports of "ghost schools", in that they 
existed only on paper. When Bisho took over the reigns of the 
feeding programme, there were no computerised record systems for 
the former Ciskei or Transkei, and the Heal th and Education 
departments had to rely on hand-written documents which can be 
easily tampered with. The departments could further not rule out 
the possibility that they had indeed been tampered with. 
According to Amner, at least R2,8 million of the PSNP's initial 
budge.t had been "gobbled up by various scams in the Eastern Cape" 
(1995,33). Some of these scams had been committed by recycling 
suppliers' invoices, for example, officia~s gltered invoices an~ 
resubmitted them for paymeLt. They would then open an account 
in the suppliers name and deposit the cheque into their account 
(Amner, 1995: 33). Some school principals and contractors inflated 
pupil estimates so as to receive more funds. These reports 
prompted an investigation which led to the discovery of more 
fraud and corruption. 
1.3.2. Information Systems 
This raises the question of how one can be expected to manage a 
huge development proj ect if one does not have reliable data. 
"With inadequate information about its school system and even 
less information about the nutritional status of pupils, the 
Eastern Cape scqeme was unable to target the neediest schools" 
(Amner,1995:35). Sheelagh Shelver adds to this by commenting on 
the status of the programme under the new auspices of the five 
NGOs. She believes that the NGOs that are now feeding are better 
equipped to do the job, because they have been feeding in the 
area and know of the presence of schools that the government 
perhaps had no knowledge of. However, the organisations now have 
areas too large to be fully acquainted with, and small schools, 
particularly in the farm areas, those that have the most need for 
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programmes like this, will be left out of the process. Feeding 
every scholar in the pre-primary classes of every Eastern Cape 
school is a huge task, to say th.~ 'least, and those that the 
programme seeks to target most, will be ignored or overlooked 
(Sheelagh Shelver,Interview 2). 
1.3.3. Overstretching the budget 
The provincial administration of the programme tried to feed 
every primary school child in the province, regardless of need. 
The budget was far too small to be able to feed 1,9 million 
pupils, by Mr Bata's own admission (Interview 2). Amner points 
out that this is a case of basic mental arithmetic; 1,9 million 
pupils multiplied by 180 school days multiplied by 70c per pupil 
amounts to R239,4 million (1995:8). There simply had to be 
targeting so as to ensure that the budget stretched to April 
1996. 
1.3.4. There was no clear aim 
The programme held as its aims the eradication of malnutrition, 
attracting children to school, to get them through the school day 
once they were there and to empower the communi ty through the use 
of small business and community groups as suppliers. In so doing 
the PSNP was unable to target one clear and identifiable aim-and 
to stick to a programme to achieve it (Amner,1995:9) 
1.3.5. The monitoring procedures were inadequate. 
In its haste to deliver a programme, the administration of the 
programme failed to put in place procedures for evaluating the 
programme and fqr merely monitoring where the money was spent. 
1.3.6. The inherent tension between government and development 
programmes. 
One of the difficulties of the PSNP is that there is an inherent 
tension between what a government's stated intentions are and 
what it really intends to gain. The history of the South African 
governments ' involvement in nutri tional development, particularly 
after 1991, when the National Party were involved in a bid to 
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ensure themselves a place in the new dispensation, suggests that 
this tension does in fact exist. In August 1991, R220 million 
was made avail-able by the gO"\~e.rnment for the Nutritional 
Development Programme to provide feeding until the end of March 
1992. No set amount was allocated to the Eastern Cape, the 
second poorest region in South Africa at the time, and R390 000 
was paid out to 6 of 100 applicants (EPH,28.11.91). The Port 
Elizabeth, Uitenhage and District School Feeding Fund was 
allocated R300 000, its first allocation from government in its' 
30 year existence. The total amount allocated to the Eastern 
Cape was R400 000 (PE Express,20.11.91). The government called 
a meeting of all interested parties in December of that year, so 
as to empower people on the ground to get involved in the process 
(Weekend Post,23.11.91). 
In June 1992, it was reported that there_w~~ corruption in the 
programme in the Eastern Cape (EPH,5.1.92), at which point Dr 
Rina Venter, then Minister of Health and Population Development, 
called for all nutrit.ional aid to be streamlined into one 
programme under the auspices of the Nat.ional Nutrition and Social 
Development Programme (NNSDP). All of this aid was to be 
received through the clinics (BD,23.9.92), at "one stop services 
at grass roots level" (Citizen, 23.9.92), in a bid to create self-
reliance. The R660 million budget used big business to provide 
the food relief, which at the time charged three' times as much 
as NGOs providing the same service. 
One of the organisations granted a tender to provide feeding was 
co-ordinated by~Dr Louis Pasques, who had military intelligence 
links and had never been involved -in feeding (WM&G, 5.6.92) . 
Operation Hunger at the time made accusations that the programme 
would never combat starvation in South Africa. It claimed that 
the programme was allocating funds to new organisations that had 
no knowledge of South Africa's particular nutritional context, 
and that months after the tenders had been allocated feeding had 
not occurred. Operation Hunger had to close some of its feeding 
schemes because these new organisations had been granted funds 
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they had hoped to gain (Star,25.9.92) This experience suggests 
that the former government embarked on these programmes not so 
much out of a genuine desire to f~~d solutions to the problem of 
nutrition but rather, in a last- minute bid to ensure for itself 
a section of the vote that would gain ita place in the 
Government of National Unity. Ironically, the new government's 
PSNP appears to have been characterised by the same malaise, 
suggesting that there is an in-built tension in attempts by 
governments to embark on programmes of this nature. 
1.3.7. The government's examination of the PSNP 
Because of the criticism levelled at the government in terms of 
the PSNP, it established a number of audits and task teams. In 
August 1995 the Technical Task Team that had been investigating 
the PSNP, released their report to the 
RDP standing committee. The standing co~m~~tee would evaluate 
the recommendations of the report and on this basis decide how 
the programme should be further implemented. 
1.3.7.1. Technical Task Team Report 
By way of introduction to the reasons for the PSNP being 
investigated, the task team lists: 
a) the lack of input from the provincial administration as-to 
budgetary allocations, 
b) the lack of reliable data available to the administrators of 
the programme, 
c) the lack of commensurate reduction in the price of the menu 
supplied with the reduction in the second budget, 
d) the ineffective tendering system and, 
e) the lack of effective planning and monitoring procedu~es, 
as the reasons for the failure of the project (Annexure to the 
RDP Standing Committee report, September 1995) 
The task team's first mandate was an investigation into the 
wastage of food in relatively affluent schools. The Task Team 
conceded that there may have been areas in the region where 
feeding was not necessary because there was no presence of 
13 
malnutrition and because some families could indeed afford to 
feed their children themselves. Tpe report concludes, on this 
'" 
count, that there is a need for strict targeting to be embarked 
upon. To this end, initial steps to ensure this were initiated, 
in the form of a weighing programme to establish areas where 
nutri tional problems were at their worse. "A specif_ic. targeting 
phase should take place from January to March 1996 whereby 
identified needy schools would have formalised nutrition and 
socio-economic surveys" (Annexure to the Standing Committee 
Report,September 1995). 
Although this was done to a certain extent, these surveys have 
by no means been carried out in every school deemed needy. The 
programme's targeting procedure means that needy schools include 
state schools and rural schools, and exclude Model C, private and 
church schools. Now that the programme io administered by NGOs 
there is perhaps a clearer idea of which schools are included in 
the definition of needy, because the NGOs have contact with the 
communities on the ground. 
It is clear that Mr Bata, himself, has a rather crude 
understanding of how to tell who is most needy and a completely 
inadequate understanding of the complexity at hand. This'ls 
evidenced by his reply to the question of whom the government 
sees as needy; "it is 'quite clear' to the government and the 
NGOs who needs feeding", was his reply. "It is obvious to us who 
the recipients of this programme should be those who were 
discriminated against under Apartheid" (Bata, Interview 1). 
Exactly who tho~e children are and ho~ the administrators of the 
programme are supposed to find out where they live is> still 
unclear at this stage. 
The report further states that the following were problems 
encountered by the PSNP: 
1. The lack of an effective monitoring procedure meant that 
problems were suspected but could not be proven. 
2. Communities were "manipulated" by those wishing to tender, 
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to ensure that prospective tenderers won their contracts. 
3. Confusion over who had in fact won the tenders resulted in 
~. '0', 
duplicity of fe~ding.< . 
4. A culture of going against the authority of the regional 
government arose, due to an apparent reluctance on the part of 
administrators to repeatedly refer to Bisho. 
5. There was no real empowerment in the communities, because; 
a. Tenders were won by affluent sectors of the community 
b. Women's groups fronted for big business 
c. Some groups sold their contracts to big business 
d. NGOs were omitted from the process (Annexure to the RDP 
Standing Committee Report, September 1995:35) 
The solutions recommended by the Task Team were as follows: 
1. A competent management staff was to be hired immediately, 
2. Feeding was to res~me immediately, withi~-the constraints of 
the budget, 
3. Donated staff should be formalised, 
4. Governing bodies, which are adequately trained, were to be 
established in all schools, 
5. Underskilled suppliers were to be given aid in terms of 
technical skills, 
6. The Rapid Audit results were to be formalised, 
7 . The procuring system was to be changed from tender to 
quotation, 
8. Computers were to be used and personnel trained in their 
functioning, 
9. Communities were tJ consulted on their ideas for the PSNP, 
10. Appropriat~ accounting procedure~ were to be set in place 
(Annexure to the RDP Standing Committee Report,September 
1995: 36) . 
The RDP Standing Committee made the recommendation that the 
delivery of the PSNP be divided into short- and long-term 
strategies. 
The short-term: The committee found that the Task Team's report 
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did not provide a "feasible" short-term solution. The 
administrators of the PSNP, in the ~Qort-term, was to be handed 
over to the provincial government:' "The province was divided into 
6 regions and a director from the regional government was 
seconded to each region. The schools in need of feeding were to 
be immediately identified and the number of chil~ren in each 
school registered. The principal of every school was to head the 
process and the Parents Association of each school was to provide 
voluntary staff to prepare the food. 
The long-term: The PSNP should continue on its path of providing 
sustainable development in the region. A more integrated planning 
approach had to be embarked upon. Monthly reports were to be 
delivered to the RDP Standing Committee (RDP Standing Committee 
Report, September 1995:23-27). 
In the opinion of Amner, the recommendations of the RDP Standing 
Commi t tee, calling for widespread changes, "appear (ed) t'o have 
been largely ignored in favour of a morale-boosting restart to 
the programme" (1995: 9) . 
1.4. Quo Vadis? PSNP 
Eastern Cape Relief Action (ECRA) is an organisation operating 
out of Port Elizabeth and is made up of school teachers. The 
organisation used to manage a similar,programme under the former 
NNSDP and at that time targeted the neediest children in any 
given school. At present the organisation is going ahead with 
feeding in their sUb-region (A) and is feeding all primary school 
children in Sub A to Standard 2 in the schools allocated by the 
PSNP as the neediest schools. Mr Terreblanche, the co-ordinator 
of the programme for his region, admits that the organisation has 
encountered a number of problems, but these are dealt with 
immediately. 
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The organisation has encountered a number of schools that are in 
need of feeding but are not PSNP-targ~ted schools. This problem 
is dealt with swiftly. The principal of the school is asked to 
apply, in writing, to the PSNP head office in Bisho. The head 
office replies promptly, by adding these schools to their feeding 
lists and the organisation is given permission t~_~eed these 
schools. 
Mr Terreblanche has a fundamental problem with the manner in 
which the PSNP is targeting. He claims that some schools under 
his supervision do not need nutritional assistance, and others 
need help for only some students. Previously, ECRA targeted 
needy children within schools, but now the government programme 
is feeding all primary school children within a certain school, 
regardless of need. in the opinion of Mr Terreblanche this kind 
of targeting is unrealistic. "When a - child graduates from 
Standard 2 to Standard 3, he or she does not leave t,heir 
nutritional problem behind. They still need' help" 
(Terreblanche,Interview 1). 
The National Educare Forum, co-ordinated by Mr Vernon Weitz in 
the Eastern Cape, is the NGO contracted by the government to 
ensure that the PSNP is delivered in_region D. In a report dated 
2-27 September 1996, the organisation outlines the process it 
undertook in providing food to various schools. Before feeding 
began the organisation ensured that members of the community were 
sub-contracted to prepare the food. Mr Weitz (Interview 1) 
explained that this was not an easy task, because the 
organisation needs, on average, 30 POO loaves of bread a day. 
However, the organisation has undertaken to continue in' their 
endeavour to empower the community and to make them part of the 
process. Mr Weitz says that the fundamental question to be asked 
is whether this programme is "development in general, if it is 
developing an infrastructure for the use of people on the ground, 
and whether it is good for the development of children through 
education and nutrition" (Interview 1). They are also aware of 
ensuring that women, particularly, are brought into the process. 
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Mr Weitz has major policy problems with the PSNP, but points out 
that this is because of the history>o~ the programme. One of the 
biggest problems he has encountereti· is the programme's shift from 
big business to the NGO sector. "Because there is big money 
involved, big business obviously will want a part in the process. 
Previously they did have a part to play, now thererPgs to be a 
move away from this towards the NGO sector's way of doing 
things", says Mr Weitz (Interview 1). The NEF also attempts to 
ensure a level of discourse around these issues, especially in 
between NGOs involved in this sector. For this reason the 
organisation is spending the 2c profit they make on each 
sandwich, on the evaluation and reflection of the work they are 
doing. 
Mr Weitz believes that the government has to address the fact 
that it excludes the pre-primary sector 6f tile education system 
from the programme. He believes that in doing so, the progr,?mme 
is running contrary to the government's education poricy: Pre-
primaries are conceptualised as part of what is called the 
foundation phase, which ends in standard 2. The PSNP feeds 
children that are almost in the middle of that phase. The NEF 
intends to publish a newsletter every three months in which it 
means to meet these challenges in a discursive manner 
(Weitz,Interview 1). The newsletter will serve as a point of 
discourse for schools, sub-contractors, NGOs, government and co-
ordinators of the programme (NEF report, 2 -27 September 1996:9). 
Mr Weitz and hi~ organisation are at ~he forefront of using their 
expertise as a NGO and as a development agency to ensure that 
there is empowerment in the communities they are serving and that 
there is a real confrontation of challenges on their part. This 
is perhaps what the government intended when it brought NGOs on 
board the process. 
Daily Bread Charitable Trust, based in East London, is accustomed 
to serving destitute c0mmunities. They have been involved with 
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pre-primary feeding in the past and thought it important that 
feeding continue in the primary school-going years. According 
to Ms Christine Gush, a fieldworker for the organisation, DBCT 
has had its share of problems since it was commissioned to the 
PSNP. Ms Gush believes that although problems must be attended 
to, the delivery of food cannot be hampered and th~~~ildren of 
the region cannot become victims of political squabblings or 
administrative problems. Daily Bread hopes that there are other 
NGOs in their region who would be willing to work with them, 
because an "intersectoral programme is most productive" 
(Gush,Interview 1). 
Irwin Friedman, of the NPPHCN, believes that the PSNP cannot be 
expe6ted to do what it was never intended to do. It intended 
to provide 30% RDA of energy levels and to get children to 
school. While the children were there they bad something to eat 
so as to increase their concentration levels. Dr Friedman,says 
that in these terms the programme is fulfilling its role 
(Friedman,Interview 1) 
Shelver believes that this difference is only subtle, because in 
the perception of those receiving the sandwich and their 
families, it is not the 30% RDA oE energy that brings them to 
school, it is that there is no food at home. The nutritional 
value of the food is of little consequence to hungry people. 
This also releases some of the burden on the household, because 
it frees up food (Shelver, Interview 1) . 
The PSNP took over many of Operation Hunger's feeding schemes, 
allowing the government to relinquish a number of unsusta'inable 
programmes that they had been involved in. Shelver believes that 
this suited the government policy at the time as they did not 
want other stake holders involved. However, many stake holders 
can often result in duplication and a lack of standardisation 
(Shelver,Interview 1). 
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According to Operation Hunger, there are children in the urban 
areas of Port Elizabeth that do no~ have enough nutrients in 
their bodies, as far as scientific'measures of malnutrition are 
concerned. Whilst collecting nutritional status data in a Port 
Elizabeth scheme that Operation Hunger is involved in, Shelver 
found that the PSNP's delivery was sporadic even to~~r9s the end 
of last year (Shelver, Interview 1) . The feeding schemes that are 
being run by Operation Hunger in Port Elizabeth are intended for 
children that are pre-school going. Operation Hunger supplies a 
peanut butter sandwich and a cup of soup. This meal is 
considerably above 30% RDA. 
According to Mr Kulekile Bata, Public Relations Officer for the 
Eastern Cape government, the PSNP is now being run by NGOs 
because "they are used to these communities, and they are known 
and are accepted, and they are experienced in- these communities-. 
They have a track record of delivery" (Bata, Interview 2). }JGOs 
that won tenders for their particular regions had to- adhere to 
a number of conditions. They have to be a non-profit 
organisations. They have to carry out the vision of the Health 
Ministry and that of the President. They have to have a proven 
track record in feeding and in capacity-building. They have to 
be prepared to interact with the cQmmunities in the sub-region 
in which they work. Mr Bata believes that the NGOs who have 
gained the contracts to feed in these sub regions can cover 
their entire areas because they had signed legally binding 
documents that hold them precisely to this fact. He further 
states that the government chose these particular NGOs because 
it believes in chern (Bata,Interview _~). 
The PSNP, as defined by Mr Bata, is not meant to continue 
indefinitely. As conditions in South Africa improve, due to RDP 
programmes, the PSNP will outlive its usefulness. The PSNP will 
give people the capacity to enure sustainability by teaching them 
skills to plan their own projects and give them more control over 
their lives. The PSNP is due to stop in 1999 (Bata,Interview 2). 
One of the concerns of the NGO sector is that when this occurs 
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the funding and infrastructure for organisations involved in 
feeding will cease to exist. 
Mr Bata believes that the PSNP is, in fact, a success story. 
"In the last two years we have managed to feed school children. 
We have had problems, we admit, but this programme pgS touched 
r __ 
and had a significant impact on the lives of the communities, on 
the lives of the children" (Bata,Interview 2). 
1.5. Conclusion 
The fact that children have received food in the Eastern Cape, 
that there has been some level of job creation and that there has 
been-some economic growth in terms of those who tendered to the 
PSNP, is a good thing. One has to be heartless to not be moved 
by the scene of children happily eatin'g-their peanut-butter 
sandwiches. However there are still a number of fundam~ptal 
questions which remain unanswered. It is the contention df this 
thesis that the dual problems of nutrition and education can 
better be addressed by NGOs active at the very local level. This 
contention is held because of the more general belief that NGOs 
develop for development's sake and governments develop so that 
they remain in power. 
FIGURE 1 
,PROVINCE OF THE EASTERN CAPE SUB REGIOlJS ALLOCATED TO NGOs 
KEY: A - Eastern Cape Relief Action 
B - Association for Consumer Justice 
C - Daily Bread Charitable Trust 
D - National Educare Forum 
E - Provincial Council of Churches 
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Theory of the State 
2.1. Overview 
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CHAPTER TWO 
i., 
Governments often appear to behave in ways that are difficult to 
understand. They give varying and sometimes contradictory 
explanations for their own behaviour. They embark on courses of 
action which appear at the outset doomed to fail. Some have 
concluded as a result that governments are ill-equipped to engage 
in many of the activities they may wish to become involved in. 
State theory is a well established theoretical field in political 
studies. The literature attempts to explain the constraints 
under which the various components of st§.t.es operate. The 
present thesis will seek to apply some of the insights of recent 
contributions to this literature in the attempt to understC).,nd' why 
the government embarked on and persisted with/ the PSNP despite 
its obvious shortcomings. The thesis will therefore be guided by 
theories of the state that ask important questions regarding the 
appropriateness of the state system in delivering social services 
in an attempt to explain why states behave as they do. The main 
question under review is why the PSNP in the Eastern Cape has 
failed and whether the state/ indeed/ is equipped to deal with 
this kind of programme. For most theorists the answer lies in 
how they conceptualise the nature of the state. It is/ further/ 
the intention of the thesis to come to a conclusion as to which 
actors/ in gove~nance/ are best-equipped to deal with particular 
activities. What follows is a brief' summary of the schools of 
thought that will be explored in this thesis. 
The functionalists / for example Durkheim/ believe that as society 
progresses/ so the size and functions of the state will increase. 
The state becomes involved in all functions of society and 
becomes an obj ect to be seized by every interest group in 
society. 
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Pluralism contends that the state is an arena for interest group 
competition. Capitalists are at th~_ forefront of the competition 
>--
for the government's attention, because they own the resources 
and because their preservation is necessary for the duplication 
of capitalism itself. 
The exponents of the Public Choice school, such as Le Grand, 
believe that governments behave according to the assumption that 
agents acts in their own interests. He argues that governments 
fail in a similar fashion to markets. If all relevant agents in 
a market are pursuing their own interests, the result will be the 
allocation of a commodity that is socially inefficient. Lipton 
and Simkins, also belonging to the Public Choice school, use the 
South African Apartheid regime as a case study to show how a 
state functions in order to maintain power. 
In the Marxist school there are a number of views as to how the 
capitalist class dominates the state. The first is that the 
capitalist class: actually hold office, secondly that they 
influence those that hold office, thirdly that the state always 
acts in the interest of the ruling class, and fourthly that 
sometimes the state acts contrary to the capitalist class, but 
in the interests of capitalism in general. This explains why 
states behave like they do. 
Weberians believe that how autonomous a state is depends on how 
well it can negate societal demands. The greater the resources 
behind those making the demands and the greater the state's 
resistance to them, the more autonomous the state is. The main 
thrust of their argument is that states can and often do act in 
their own interests. 
The following section will review a number of schools of thought 
concerning the state in terms of these three categories. The 
first four conceptions of state attempt to define what is meant 
by the term state. 
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2.2. The normative state 
Those that subscribe to this for~0f state posit that the state 
is a symbol of a particular society that is bound together by a 
common culture, legal system and norms, and are thereby set apart 
from other groups of people in the world. Therefore, this 
r- ~ 
conception focuses on the state's relationship with its society. 
This conception underscores that the state is sovereign. This 
view of the state neglects the fact that many nations are deeply 
divided along racial, ethnic, religious or normative lines 
(Ferguson and Mansbach,1989:42) 
2.3. The state as ethno-cultural unit 
Theorists have, in general terms, distinguished between the terms 
state and nation, but over the past century-there has been an 
increased identification with the two terms at the grass ~~ots 
level. Ferguson and Mansbach therefore categorise this kind of 
theory of state in terms of its relationship with the society 
that it serves (Ibid:47). 
2.4. The functionalist state 
The leading proponent of the state as a functional unit, 
Durkheim, posits that the greater the society's development, the 
greater the development of that state. The state becomes 
increasingly involved in all functions in society, thereby 
centralising these functions. The development of the state also 
includes the increased division of labour and specialisation in 
society (Ibid:46). 
The neo-functionalists, Badie and Birnbaum argue that 
... once the state becomes an autonomous power centre, wITh 
access to previously unavailable sources of power, it 
becomes a target of political action, an objective to 
besieged by every organised group that wishes to impose E 
own ends on society as a whole (Ibid:47). 
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2.5. The pluralist state 
At the opposite-end of the spectrum from the Marxists, is the 
pluralist school. This position holds that the state is an arena 
for interest group competition. The state is merely a reflection 
of the interest group that at any given time is able to muster 
...-- ~ 
enough power to influence state policy. The state is viewed as 
a "passive recipient of societal pressure" (Ferguson and 
Mansbach,1989:51), and in this sense, is not entirely different 
from the Marxist conception. 
The following understandings of the term state will form the bulk 
of this chapter and will attempt to understand how the state 
functions vis a vis its society. 
2.6. The Public Choice School 
The public choice school subscribes to the belie~ that 
governments behave in the interests of those that make up the 
state. Julian Le Grand posits that governments behave according 
to the assumption that "all relevant agents pursue their self 
interest" (Le Grand, 1391: 423). Le Grand examines three kinds 
of government activity, namely: provision, subsidy· - arid 
regulation. He argues that governments fail in a similar way to 
markets. Under certain conditions: 
the production and distribution of a 
competi ti ve market in which all the 
pursuing their own self-interest 
allocation of that commodity 
inefficien£ (Le Grand,1991:423). 
commodity through a 
relevant agents are 
will result in an 
that is socially 
This means that competitive markets with agents that pursue- their 
own interests can fail in terms of their ability to provide their 
commodities efficiently. 
inequitable. 
They will also fail because they are 
The Public Choice school investigat8s the implications should 
government pursue its own interests. This investigation is based 
on the theory of market failure and is used to establish the 
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reasons why market allocations will be inefficient. The theory 
is often accompanied by a move in the direction of a welfare 
".- ~, 
state and a more equitable system! given that market allocations 
are inequitable. The principal emphasis of the theory is on 
efficiency (Le Grand,1991:424). 
Efficiency is defined in a number of ways. In lay-person's terms 
efficiency is defined as the production of a commodity at minimum 
cost in terms of resources used. This is known as x-efficiency. 
If a commodity is X-inefficient then it will also be allocatively 
inefficient. This definition also takes account of whether the 
commodity meets the wants of the consumer as effectively as 
possible. More formally the term means that -II it is impossible 
to re-allocate resources in such a way as to make one or more 
persons better off without making someone else worse off" (Le 
Grand,1991:425) At the level of the firm,.;...dynamic efficiency, 
is the capacity of the firm to innovate and thereby lower their 
costs of production or better meet the wants of the consumer. At 
the level of the nation state, dynamic efficiency is identified 
with the rate of economic growth, the higher the growth rate, the 
more dynamically efficient the country (Le Grand,1991:425). 
The theory of market failure refers to the market's inability·to 
achieve allocative efficiency. 
the needs or wants of the 
This means that it does not meet 
consumer. The allocation of a 
commodity through a competitive market will be allocatively 
inefficient if the market for that commodity possesses a number 
or all of certain characteristics. These are; 
2.6.1. Externalities and public goods 
These arise when a third party, who is no other way involved, is 
affected either by the production or consumption of a commodity. 
If the party is affected positively, this is called an external 
benefit, is affected negatively, this is known as an external 
cost. An example of a commodity with external benefits would be 
housing improvements and an example of an external cost would be 
pollution (Le Grand,1991:426). The extreme case of external 
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benefits is public goods. This is when it is impossible for one 
person to consume the commodity without the entire community 
,..- ~~ 
benefiting from-it, for example,<street lighting or a national 
defence force. Markets with self-interested agents will under-
provide external benefits because the agents cannot capture those 
benefits. They will not take these benefits into account when 
.- - ~ 
making decisions about the appropriate level of activity, they 
will only consider their own benefits. Markets further tend to 
over-provide external costs. This is because these costs do not 
impinge on the agents undertaking the activity, so it is not in 
their interest to consider them. There will be a greater level 
of activity than allocative efficiency requires (Le 
Grand,1991: 426) 
2.6.2. Increasing returns to scale 
The average cost of production decreases- as the scale ot 
production increases. Increasing returns to scale gi v~s a 
competitive advantage to large firms which will tend to 
monopolise the market. This will be X-efficient, because the 
commodity is produced at minimum cost, but it would not be 
allocatively efficient, because too little would be produced at 
too high a price (Le Grand,1991:427) 
2.6.3. Imperfect information 
This is the imbalance of information between the consumer and 
producer. For example, in the field of medical care, doctors 
know more about health than the patient, so the doctor can 
exploit the patient telling her that she needs more health care 
than she really -does. Medical care will be oversupplied relative 
-' 
to the efficient level (Le Grand,1991:427). 
The second part of Le Grand's argument concerns equity. 
Equity has two dimensions; it concerns the distribution of the 
commodity concerned, which means that it is distributed equally 
or at least everyone has the ability to obtain a minimum standard 
of consumption. Secon~ly, it concerns the overall ability by 
28 
consumers to buy the commodities they need and want, it is about 
"command over economic resources" (Le Grand,1991:428) . 
... - l:., 
Le Grand cites Wolf's theory of government failure. Wolf 
proposes that government's might not fail in terms of their 
efficiency were they to behave more like markets. Wolf 
i"'" - ~ 
concentrates on three reasons why self interested governments 
fail. The first reason is most relevant for our purposes and is; 
in the market the cost of production is linked to the income that 
sustains it. However, in non-market enterprise the misallocation 
of resources is more prevalent, because it is linked to non-price 
sources such as taxes. When revenues that sustain an activity 
are unrelated to the cost of that activity, more resources than 
necessary may be used to produce a certain output. It is 
important to note at this stage that if possibilities exist for 
lowering the cost of production, or raising-productivity, they 
are more likely to be ignored by non-market activities tha? by 
market activities. Le Grand does point out, though, that not all 
forms of government intervention involve a disjunction between 
revenues and costs, some government institutions market their 
products in a similar fashion to that of the market. Even if 
there is a disjunction between revenues and costs, this does not 
mean that there will necessarily be inefficiency (Le Grand, 
1991:428). Governments do not have the indicators of efficiency 
that economies have. They act in a self - inte'rested manner, 
ignoring the fact that they may not be providing an efficient 
service to their constituents. The PSNP administration, 
motivated by the attempt of ensuring re-election, did not take 
into account th~t the service they were providing was inefficient 
because they had no cost indicators to show them that it was, in 
fact, inefficient and because they merely continued on their own 
agenda. 
The alternative, according to Le Grand, is for the government 
only to involve itself in three social and economic activities, 
it can provide commodities because it has access to certain 
resources, it can tax or subsidise a commodity or it can regulate 
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the price, quantity or quality of a commodity. Sometimes all 
three methods of intervention are ~~ed by the government. For 
example, the British public healEh care service provides free 
hospitalisation, subsidises health care and regulates it, 
ensuring certain standards for medical personnel (Le 
Grand,1991:430) . 
In terms of efficiency, Le Grand asks the question of why the 
government will be inadequate in the provision of an efficient 
service. One of the reasons he cites is that government 
providers are usually monopolies, sometimes provided for in the 
government's laws. They seldom have competition and are 
sometimes even protected from competition. There is no threat 
of bankruptcy, there are no shareholders to answer to and the 
market will not be taken over if they are inefficient. This 
reduces the incentive to keep costs to a minimum. This further 
means that the cost of government provision will generally be 
higher than the minimum cost that is feasible. Inefficiency may 
sometimes mean that the post will be taken over by another 
office-bearer or may mean a loss in votes, but this is not as 
effective a constraint as market contestability. For Le Grand 
there are two sets of circumstances where government provision 
on its own would be inefficient: f~rstly, where the government 
provider is a monopoly and-where there is competition from non-
profit organisations. Secondly, if the commodity is being sold 
to consumers at a price related to costs, then the consequence 
of the cost of government provision being above the minimum cost 
of provision would result in less being provided and consumed 
than would be a~locatively efficient,(Le Grand,1991:433) 
In terms of government subsidy, if a commodity is provided free, 
produced with the aid of government revenue, the only cost 
carried by the consumer is a perceived one that she has 
contributed by paying tax. If the commodity is provided at any 
price below cost, there will be excess demand for that commodity, 
demand will be in excess of the socially efficient supply. 
Forced with excess demand, there are two choices, firstly, to 
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meet all the demand, making the situation socially inefficient. 
Secondly if the government knows the amount that is socially 
inefficient, it can simply provid.~ this amount, and decide who 
gets what (Le Grand,1991:434). 
Thus, for those that subscribe to this school of thought, 
governments behave according tot he principle that ali involved 
agents act in their own interests. If all the agents are 
pursuing their own interests then the commodity that they produce 
will be socially inefficient. If a government pursues a policy 
for to secure their own interest, then that policy will be flawed 
on implementation. 
Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins also subscribe to the public 
choice school, and agree with Le Grand that governments act in 
their own interests as economic agents do . c.-They use the South 
African Apartheid regime as a case study of how a state functions 
" 
so as to maintain its power. They begin their argument by 
mentioning that, historically, the South African state was 
involved in a number of measures to intervene in the country's 
economic development. This intervention spanned across the 
international flow of goods, capital, technology, and the 
mobility of labour (Lipton and Simkins,1993:1). 
They follow the history of the South African state from union to 
the formation of the Government of National Unity, focusing at 
one point on the National Party's (NP) attempt at liberalisation 
in order to assure it a place in the new dispensation. They note 
further that thjs process began in the early 80s, when the NP 
began 
ambitious and expensive programmes of socioeconomic 
reform, some of which, notably black education, were ill-
designed, lacking in political legitimacy and tragically 
wasteful (Lipton and Simkins,1993:11). 
The demands on state resources, coupled 
inability to stop the wave of protest (on 
oppressed and business alike), began the 
with the state's 
the part of those 
Apartheid state's 
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unbundling of the bureaucracy. These periods of "winning hearts 
and minds" were frequently interrupted by periods of brutal 
militarism, such as the State of <Emergency experienced in 1986 
(Lipton and Simkins,1993:12). 
The scholarly analysis of the role of the state also began to 
change. The Public Choice school (discussed more fully above) 
"proposes an economic theory of the state" (Lipton and 
Simkins,1993:18). It argues that just as economic agents behave 
in their own interests, so do governments and their bureaucrats. 
Political actors gain support from their electorates so as to 
create "a winning coalition of interests" (Lipton and 
Simkins,1993:18). Civil servants, too, have interests of their 
own, .they are not merely the instruments of the legislature and 
executive. 
Earlier theories had justified the need for state intervention 
in the economy on the grounds of market failure. This means a 
number of things, the market is unlikely to provide public goods, 
such as roads, sanitation or defence, and it is unlikely to do 
so because it cannot charge the beneficiaries for the supply of 
these goods. The market, further, does not scope adequately with 
negative externalities such as pollution (Lipton and Simkins, 
1993:18). The reason for poth of these inadequacies is simple; 
it is not in the interests of these actors to do' so. 
Public choice theory drew attention to state failure. The 
state's capacity was handicapped by the fact that it had limited 
capabilities and by the fact that politicians and bureaucrats 
would inevitably use it power to serve their own interests or 
those of their supporters (Lipton and Simkins,1993:19). 
For Lipton and Simkins, although the state, especially at the 
early stages of development, should to some degree be involved 
in the economy, it should not allow for the "untargeted growth" 
(Lipton and Simkins,1993:23) of social services provided by the 
government. It is the contention of the authors that this leads 
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to a system that is wasteful, produces a large bureaucracy and 
can lead to "soaring taxes and/or fiscal deficits" {Lipton and 
'I.: "-, 
Simkins,1993:23f, while not necessarily addressing poverty. 
In summary, the Public Choice School posits that governments will 
fail in the same way as markets do. If the agents that are 
-~ ~ 
providing the commodity act in their own interests, the· commodi ty 
that they are producing will be inefficient. 
2.7. The Marxist state - a society-centred view 
In the classical Marxist perspective, when the proletarian class 
takes over, the state will eventually "wither away", so that 
those who are in power have no real interest in ruling. Modern 
Marxists differ on their standpoint of the relationship between 
the ruling class and the state. One posiction holds that th~ 
dominant capitalist class actually holds office, while another 
position posits that this ruling class merely influences-those 
in office. A third position is that the state always acts in the 
interest of the ruling class, and another, still, believes that 
the state sometimes acts contrary to the ruling class but in the 
interests of capitalism as a whole (Ferguson and Mansbach, 
1989:50). This point of view follows on from the Public Choice 
school in that the economYr and therefore the state, will always 
act in the interests of a particular sector of the society. If 
it is acting in its own interests or that of a particular sector 
of the society, it will produce an inefficient commodity. 
Przeworski and Wallerstein believe that the state is structurally 
dependent on capital. They define capitalism as the private 
ownership of scarce resources. Allocating these resources is the 
prerogative of the capitalist class. In a democracy citizens may 
express preference about how the resources they do not own are 
allocated. Marxist political theory claims that under 
capitalism, the social system must protect those who are the 
producers of wealth in any society. Capitalists have "public 
power which no formal institutions can overcome" {Przeworski and 
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Wallerstein,1988:11). People living in a capitalist society may 
have voting power and other political,rights, but the ability of 
a government to -attain its goals is dictated to by the power of 
capital. The different political forces that take office cannot 
al ter this, these office-bearers are merely structural. All 
governments in a capitalist system will act in the jpterests of 
the capitalists (Przeworski and Wallerstein,1988:11). 
Society is dependent on the capitalists willingness to invest, 
and this, in turn, depends on the profitability of the 
investment. Because everyone in society is dependent on the 
owners of production the state has to be too. Whether 
governments have goals of their own or whether they want to act 
in the interests of one particular group, the pursuit of any aim 
that requires material resources, places them in the situation 
of structural dependence on those that own~capital (Przeworski 
and Wo.llerstein, 1988: 12). Politicians seeking re-election depend 
on the impact of their policies on firms because these declsions 
affect employment, investment, and the like. Governments are 
dependent on owners of capital because the voters are. 
One of the questions most important to the Marxist school of 
thought, when addressing the statt:=' s role, is why the state 
should be thought of as an instrument of the ruling class. 
According to Ralph Miliband Marxists have given three answers to 
the above question. 
Firstly, the personnel that have dominated government, in terms 
of the legislaeure, executive and ~vreaucracy, have tended to 
come from the same social strata that have dominated' other 
sectors of society, namely the economic and cultural sectors. 
The argument follows that in modern capitalist states, the 
bourgeoisie dominate the three main quarters of social life - the 
economic, the political and the cultural (Miliband, 1977: 69) . 
This means that those "who run the state apparatus should, ... , 
be favourably disposed towards those who own and control the 
larger part of the means of economic activity" (Miliband, 
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1993:69). The government will be much better disposed towards 
this sector of the society than any other sector or interest 
group, and will- be convinced of < !:he fact that to serve this 
group's interest is to serve the entire society. 
The second answer that Marxists give to the question of why the 
state should be thought of as an instrument of the ruling class, 
has to do with the economic power that this group can wield in 
terms of its ownership of economic resources, and the general 
influence that it has as an "interest group" (Miliband,1977:71). 
For Miliband the capitalist class is the strongest pressure 
group in the capitalist society, but this is not the same as 
saying that the state is an instrument of the.capitalist class. 
Further, the pressure which business is able to apply on the 
government, is by no means the only explanation of the state's 
behaviour. Miliband cautions that to beli~ve this is to leave 
too much else out of the equation (Miliband,1977:72) 
The third answer relates to the nature of the state, which posits 
that the state is an instrument of the ruling class in a 
capitalist society because it has been placed in a capitalist 
mode of production. It cannot be anything else because the 
nature of the state is determined by the nature of the mode- of 
production. "There are 'structural constraints' which no 
government, can ignore or evade" (Milib'and, 1977:72). 
Capitalist society has its own "rationality" to which every 
government will eventually have to surrender. 
For Miliband the strength of this argument is that it explains 
why governments, in fact, behave as they do. The example he 
gives is that of a government that has pledged far-reaching 
reform prior to its election and has, indeed, won an election on 
that ticket. He posits that governments are seldom able to 
deliver these promises. This failing has often been attributed 
to "the personal failings of leaders, corruption, betrayal, the 
machinisations of civil servants and bankers, or a combination 
of all these" (Miliband, 1993: 73). He goes on to state that these 
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explanations may be correct, in part, but they need to 
incorporate the structural constraints within which governments 
find themselves, "within the coqt.ext of a particular mode of 
production" (Miliband,1977:73) Miliband cautions against using 
this structural constraint as an all-encompassing excuse which 
deprives government of any independent action. Governments do 
act against these constraints, but to recognise them-i~ to point 
to the "limits of reform" and to design a strategy against the 
mode of production which sets in place these constraints 
(Miliband,1977:73) . 
For Marxists, then, whatever their inclination, the state is 
dependent on capital. It was almost always act in the interests 
of the ruling class, which is the capitalist class. The state 
can be influenced by the capitalist class in a number of ways; 
sometimes the capitalist class is the go~ergment, sometimes the 
capitalist class merely influences the government, sometimes the 
state acts in the interests of capitalism as a whole and 
sometimes the state is dependent on capital because the state 
must allocate resources so as to protect those that are the 
producers of wealth in society.' To use Marxism as an all-
encompassing reason for the failure of the PSNP would be a 
mistake, and it would mean that the state can never - -act 
autonomously. Perhaps, though, the PSNP failed because the 
capitalists in our society, upon whom the government is dependent 
for investment, were willing to allow only a certain amount of 
money to be allotted to the PSNP and perhaps this amount was not 
sufficient to ensure that the programme was effective. The ANC 
did pledge widespread welfare reform prior to election and the 
owners of production in South Africa have only allowed tnem to 
do tha.t to a limited extent. A more likely scenario in terms of 
the Marxist schools' contribution is that it is not in the 
capitalists interests to ensure that the PSNP is efficient. So 
as to ensure that the investors in South Africa continue to 
finance the state, the government has been forced to prioritise 
elsewhere, and this has meant a lack of real commitment to the 
PSNP. 
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2.8. The Weberian view - a state-centred approach 
,-
The state-centred approach conceives of the state as an 
institutional reality. In contrast to society-centred 
approaches, the state-centred approach argues that the state does 
in fact act in its own interests and is an actor in its own 
r 
right. Max Weber's interest in the state is in the rise of a 
bureaucracy and the eventual move away from the awarding of 
office "on the basis of patrimony" and self-interest (Ferguson 
and Mansbach,1989:48) Weber recognised the problems of his own 
theory, admitting that not all societies had developed huge 
bureaucracies. Other scholars, like Held, have pointed out that 
Weber complicated his theory by including' in his concept of 
bureaucracy, all large forms of organisation. Weber believed 
that all forms of organisation were becoming more and more 
bureaucratised, and thE; state was "continuall-y in danger of being 
victimised by private interests" (Ferguson and Mansbach,1989 :~9) . 
One of his main concerns was how bureaucratic power could be 
checked, and thus his conception of the state becomes almost 
pluralist. 
According to Krasner, the state is an autonomous actor and cannot 
be viewed merely as a reflection of its society. 
There is a modified version of the state-centred approach which 
argues that the state is "potentially autonomous" (Skocpol quoted 
in Bertramsen, 1991: 99) . The state is no longer an agent of 
action but an institutional reality. Theorists take into account 
that because the state has goals it does not mean that it can 
necessarily achieve them. The ability to put into action state 
goals depends on the resources available to the state. A strong 
state can implement its own interests against the pressure of 
society because of the amount of resources it owns, but a weak 
state cannot carry out its own aims because of societal pressure 
and lack of resources. To sum up, the state is able to implement 
its goals if it has the resources available to do so 
(Bertramsen,1991:99) . 
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Nordlinger, classified by Krasner as a fellow statist, sees the 
state as a group of individuals rather than some kind of 
phenomena. He sees all public off~~ials as members of the state. 
He believes that the autonomy of the democratic state has been 
largely underestimated by state analysts. He posits that a 
states autonomy is determined by the correspondence between what 
it prefers and what its actions are, because too much emphasis 
has been placed on cases where state and societal preferences 
have diverged. He goes on to state that this emphasis ignores 
that state and societal preferences often converge. Further, 
when the state and its society diverge in their preferences, the 
state has enough resources at hand to bring societal preference 
in line with its own, or even to act contrary to this societal 
pref~rence (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1989: 59). So why did the South 
African government embark on the PSNP in the first place, and why 
did they continue on the same path once it b~gan to falter? Was 
it the government themselves who believed it would be a fruitful 
exercise, did they embark on the process because they b~lreved 
that a sector of society wanted such a programme or where they 
indeed going against the interests of another sector of the 
society? 
Nordlinger, in his arguments surrounding the nature of the state, 
embarks on a review of a number of other theories about the 
state. The people-centred approach holds that' government is 
reliant on society for its approval and for its material 
resources. Resources are defined as "votes, clients, 
organisations, social status, professional expertise, wealth, 
control over fipancial, industrial and landed property" 
(Nordlinger, 1987:354) Once it is realised who best ser~es the 
government's aims it is easy to translate this into public 
policy. 
A second view holds that governments enact their own policy 
opinions, turning its own perspective into policy. This view 
holds that governments act autonomously even when acting contrary 
to the interests of those that are best "politically endowed" 
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(Nordlinger, 1987:355). A third perspective espouses that the 
state acts autonomously only under €e~tain circumstances. These 
are when, the capitalist class Is divided on major political 
economic issues, the states' legitimacy as a class-neutral 
institution is in decline, social peace has broken down or is at 
risk of doing so, or capitalism's economic contrapictions are 
intensified (Nordlinger,1987:357). 
Nordlinger believes that "taking the state seriously" means more 
than just looking for instances when it acts autonomously. It 
means taking into account its outer limitations and addressing 
such questions as, how often do states act autonomously when 
those who hold political power in society are arrayed against 
them: It also means more than searching for examples of low and 
high autonomy. When one analyses the state as an independent 
variable one must question the validity and explanatory power o£ 
society-centred claims about the state (1987:358). 
Whether intentional or not, some institutions make for effective 
opposition to the state. They impact people'.s political beliefs 
and attitudes and their level of political participation. They 
also impact people's divisiveness along racial, class and 
interest group lines. The state -is embedded in society, so 
taking the state seriously also means analysin~ the relations 
within society, between the state and organisations or society 
as a whole (Nordlinger,1987:361). 
An al ternati ve theory, proposed by Nordlinger, suggests that 
government autonomy be gauged in terms of how well the state 
manages to negate societal demands. The greater the private 
resources behind those making the demands, and the better the 
state is able to withstand those demands, the greater its 
autonomy. Nordlinger reviews this theory with reference to 
other schools of thought, deciding that, in essence, they all 
reach the same conclusion. In Marxist terms, the state is 
relatively autonomous when it can overcome the demands of the 
dominant capitalist class. Krasner adds a second dimension, 
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stating that "the degree of societal change successfully 
engineered by the state" (Nordlinger,1987:364), determines its 
,..- ~-
autonomy. So the states autonomy,is not only determined by its 
ability to resist demands, but also by its ability to change 
behavioural patterns. 
r 
A point to remember at this stage is that sometimes the state's 
agenda will be in line with that of the civil society. This does 
not mean that the state is not autonomous. If officials make 
public policy with the support of society it is no less 
significant than if they were to do so without their mandate. 
Another interjection is that sometimes states make policy after 
they have been able to change societal prefe~ences to be in line 
with-their own. For Nordlinger this is still a strong state, 
even though they have not had to make policy in the face of 
adversity. The crux of the argument-~und autonomy for 
Nordlinger is that the measure of power is not the scope of 
change but the amount of societal support the state enjoys and 
the degree of opposition it overcomes, whatever its goals may be, 
"including the preservation of the status quo" (1987:366). 
Nordlinger suggests a typology of states for analysing the 
autonomy of states, which includes four types of state: strong, 
independent , responsive and weak. Strong states enj oy high 
autonomy and support, they act regularly on their preferences and 
have support in doing so. Independent states have high autonomy, 
but lack support, they frequently translate their preferences 
into public policy despite societal preferences. Responsive 
states act in aGcordance with societal preferences. Weak states 
strive to act autonomously despite divergent societal views, but 
failing to do so rank low in both autonomy and support 
(Nordlinger, 1987:359). 
For those who subscribe to a statist point of view, a states' 
autonomy depends on its ability to negate societal demands. The 
point for these theorists is that is that states often do act in 
their own interest and not in the interest of any particular 
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sector of the society. Another important point to remember is 
that because a government has goals it does not necessarily mean 
> ,-
that it will achieve them. 
2.9. Conclusion 
The most pertinent insights that have been offered here in terms 
of why the PSNP failed and why, indeed, states behave as they do, 
are advanced by the Public Choice, Marxist and Weberian schools. 
For the Public Choice advocates the PSNP failed because the 
agents that were attempting to provide the service, were acting 
in their own interest, in that the government attempts to ensure 
re-election. Marxists would answer that" the programme was 
perhaps not in the interests of the ruling class, whom the 
government always acts in the interests of, and that this meant 
a lack of commitment to the programme- Qfl- the part of the 
government. For the Weberian school of thought, the govern~ent 
could have been acting in its own interests in implementing the 
PSNP or in the interests of others, but it did function 
autonomously. All of these theories offer important points as 
to the fact that the government was acting on its own agenda when 
it implemented the PSNP. 
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CHAPTER TIlREE 
" 
Nongovernmental 'Organisations 
3.1. Introduction 
At the United Nations Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995, NGOs 
were excluded from sending delegations on the grounds that they 
did not represent particular states. They argued that the 
problems faced by women today are no longer bound by borders and 
that these issues should be addressed across the board. In 
protest, they held their own conference alongside the United 
Nations seminar. It is the contention of this thesis that NGOs 
have 'a large role to play in the development of the world as a 
whole, that they can make up for or do better, or at least well, 
things that governments struggle to do. -
3.2. What is a NGO? 
Peter Willets prefers to use the term pressure groups when 
referring to NGOs, as he believes it best defines the way in 
which they seek to exercise influence. "They may try to bring 
about social change by the direct effect of their action on other 
individuals, by their impact upon qther groups or by affecting 
government policy" (Willets,1982:1). 
Willets categorises pressure groups into five types. Firstly, 
international "welfare agencies", run 
services to those who cannot afford them. 
programmes to provide 
Many of these agencies 
are highly specralised in their field:. Previously these agencies 
would have no real contact with the country that they sent aid 
to, but it is becoming more prevalent, with a shift in 
development theory, to have a more grass-roots contact with those 
receiving aid, for example Oxfam and World Vision 
(Willets,1982:4) 
Secondly, religious organisations are involved in the general 
promotion of values, an example of these types of organisations 
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is Women for Peace. Thirdly, communal groups are those which 
promote a certain segment of the .. pppulation' s interests, for 
example a women's group or ethnic group, an example of these kind 
of groups would be Inkatha when it was still a cultural movement. 
Fourthly, political parties are often seen as different from 
pressure groups in that they actually want to take ~tfjce rather 
than influence the government of the day. But, according to 
Willets, this does not accurately describe how groups work in 
practice. If pressure groups have wide-spread support they can 
always convert into political parties, an example of this kind 
of organisation is the African National Congress. The last 
categorisation is the "specific-issue, promotional group" 
(Willets,1982:8). These groups are those that have sought to 
bring about social change on a particular issue by bringing about 
change in government policy. Usually they either raise new 
issues that have not entered the political~agenda, or they try 
to change the way in which the issue is being handled. Ip so 
doing they try to influence the media and public opinion ~ 'These 
groups frequently communicate with other groups in other 
countries that are dealing with the same or similar issues, and 
often international NGOs are formed around the issues, an example 
of this is Greenpeace. 
There are further distinctions to be made between types of NGOs. 
1. NGOs in the North and those in developing countries 
2. Organisations with a membership and those without 
3. Grass roots groups and those NGOs that administer support 
to the grass roots. 
Yet another way of classifying NGOs is by distinguishing between 
the reasons for their formation: 
a) in response to crises, 
b) in the name of development, 
c) in opposition to a repressive government, 
but all seem to have been formed as part of a "survival 
strategy" (Bebbington and Farrington, 1993:201) . 
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Korten classifies NGOs in four generations, distinguished by 
strategies for achieving develop~ent. First generation 
strategies invoive NGOs in direct-delivery of a service which 
aims to alleviate an immediate problem in the community. The NGO 
in this case relates directly to the person or group of persons 
it aims to assist. The aim of the NGO in these circ~mstances is 
to provide immediate relief from a situation of poverty, hunger 
or lack of health care. The service delivered depends entirely 
on the resources of the NGO (Korten, 1990:115). Examples of this 
kind of organisation are those started in response to the 
difficulties experienced after the Second World War; Catholic 
Relief Services, OXFAM and CARE. 
Second generation strategies involve helping people to better 
equip themselves to meet their own needs. These strategies have 
in mind that the benefits will remain in the'tommunity long after 
the NGO has departed. The strategy attempts to empower lpcal 
people. This kind of strategy calls on the NGO to playmbre of 
a mobilising role than to actually deliver services and the 
underlying assumption is that those living in situations of 
underdevelopment are able to empower themselves but they are 
unable to do so for some or other reason. Korten believes that 
in practice these strategies are little more than handouts in a 
"sophisticated guise" (Korten,1990:119). 
Third generation strategies attempt to affect policy and seek 
changes on "local, national and global levels" (Korten, 1990: 
120). When NGOs embark on third generational strategies it is 
because there" is a realisation that second generational 
strategies "can never hope to benefit more than a few favoured 
localities" (Korten, 1990: 120) . It seeks to formulate policy 
which creates sustainable development at the local level. 
Fourth generation strategies move beyond formulation of policy, 
their aim is to "energise a critical mass of independent, 
decentralised initiative in support of a social vision" 
(Korten,1990:123). Korten concludes by positing that NGOs have 
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a new role in the international arena, and that is to become 
"facilitators of a global people's .. dt=velopment 
movement" (Korten, 1990: 124) . ' . 
Many scholars feel the need to develop a new breed of competent 
NGOs "capable of mobilising large numbers of r_p~ople and 
channelling large sums of money to a variety of activities" 
(Uvin,1995:927) and these organisations should interact with the 
domestic state and international organisations. This process is 
called scaling up, which in essence means to increase the impact 
of grassroots organisations and their programmes. 
Uvin defines scaling up in four forms. Firstly, quantitative 
scaling up means that the organisation expands its size by 
increasing its membership. This is the most self-evident kind 
of scaling up, indicating growth in its mo~t basic form. This 
occurs when NGOs manage to attract increasing numbers of mem,Pers 
into their fold. Secondly, functional scaling up is where a NGO 
increases the kinds of functions it embarks upon. Operation 
Hunger, for example, embarked uP9n this pr?cess in Tamboville 
when it started out as a nutritional project and expanded into 
job creation. Thirdly, political scaling up occurs when 
organisations direct their projects away from merely providing 
services to chal12nging the structural causes of 
underdevelopment. This usually involves relations with the 
state. Fourthly, organisational scaling up occurs when NGOs 
increase their organisational capacity so that they become more 
effective and efficient. This includes the growth of the 
organisation and ability to learn fr9m the previous mistakes of 
the organisation (Uvin,1995:929). 
A fifth indicator of scaling up is added to Uvin's previous 
analysis and is termed integration. This occurs when existing 
structures and networks of NGOs are taken over by others, in 
particular this refers to "government structures after it has 
demonstrated its potential" (Uvin, 1995: 931). This can come about 
through the demands of the NGO on the government or as a result 
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of independent state action. It is argued that this form of 
scaling up is often necessary for ~~e sustainability of an NGO 
initiated programme. "It rarely< occurs, however, for it goes 
against the ideological and organisational dynamics of most NGOs 
and governments (mutual distrust and a desire for exclusive 
control of operations ... )" (Uvin, 1995:932). A re9~~t example 
of this may be the contracting by the government of various NGOs 
to fulfil the policy objective of the PSNP. 
Whether 
finance, 
voluntary aid 
almost all 
organisations 
of them can 
falter due 
categorised 
to lack of 
as "doers" 
(Stamp,1982:84). Few of these organisations aim to be primarily 
pressure groups. 
3.3. The International dimension and relationship to state 
Traditionally pressure groups have been relevant to the study of 
domestic politics, but they are becoming more influential 'in the 
international arena O-villets,1982: 1) . Stamp claims that the 
perception of state responsibility has changed dramatically in 
the last hundred years, so that we now expect the state to 
provide a host of services, ranging from medical services to 
education. In recent times this concept has been 
internationalised, so that-we now have a responsibility for the 
welfare of humankind in general. However, it is still NGOs that 
provide these services in the developing countries. Some of 
these pressure the governments of a particular country to take 
responsibility for their citizens, but most simply provide the 
services themse-lves. "By influencip.9 public opinion at home 
among donors and taxpayers, and in helping the poor in the 
recei ving countries, they may ultimately be more effective" 
(Stamp, 1982:84). 
In some areas NGOs have acquired significant status with 
international actors. Clark cites the international organisation 
Amnesty International, as one which grew in stature out of its 
humble beginnings of petitioning governments committing human 
46 
rights abuses. Amnesty International has now come to be a source 
of information for many other institutions, amongst them, the 
. ,-
United Nations. - There are other organisations that play similar 
roles. All of these organisations are bound by the fact that 
they attempt to influence government by "applying general human 
rights principals to particular situations" (Clark, 1995: 507) . 
.,.... - ~ 
There are also a growing number of environmental groups seeking 
to ensure that governments adhere to international standards. 
Others organise development projects, funded by private 
contributors. Clark believes that these organisations have one 
main fact in common: that they "nearly always act in 
counterpoint with governmental actors" (Clark,1995:507) 
Certain issue areas, like human rights and environmental issues, 
have started at a grass roots level and entered the international 
arena. So much so that they have comet~ be viewed as new 
"international actors that represent non-state interests" 
(Clark,1995:509) . 
In the future NGOs are likely to have more expertise and 
knowledge on their issues than any diplomat. NGO "faithfulness 
to principle" (Clark, 1995: 513) rather than to a particular 
interest or interest group gives them the potential-for 
autonomous influence in the- international arena. The interaction 
of NGOs may be said to form an international civil society that 
allows for grass-roots political participation around issues that 
the particular state does not cater for. 
Historically, NGOs in the international sphere have been thought 
of in terms of expert consultants. Their presence at certain 
international conventions has allowed them to get their issues 
onto the agenda, at least, and to be part of international 
declarations, eg NGOs had a large impact on the UN's Women's 
(beij ing) Conference, the UN's Conference on Population and 
Development and its' Earth Summit in Rio. The expertise provided 
by NGOs extends to "consultation on che drafting of particular 
texts formally advanced by states in intergovernmental 
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discussions" (Clark, 1995: 517) . Clark quotes Philip Alston as 
saying that NGOs can have great imp"a~t on government because it 
is now "increasingly difficult te ·stem the flow of information 
from local groups to international 'umbrella' human rights groups 
and international governmental monitoring bodies" (Clark, 
1995:518). 
In most complex societies a number of groups can arise around a 
single issue, often collaborating or exchanging information. 
NGOs, which are now included in more than a consultative 
capacity, at the UN strive for the responsibilities of the 
organisation to move beyond that of security. Previously, NGO 
delegations to the UN have sought to include "some provision for 
dealing with questions related to educational and cultural co-
operation, human rights .. , and to the economic and social area 
in general" (quoted in Willets, 1982: 11). Some authors claim that 
NGOs were directly responsible for the existence of the Chart~r's 
provision on human rights. It has now become standard practice 
to include NGOs in any UN proceedings. However, NGOs are often 
disgruntled by the international communities' unwillingness to 
take them seriously and have in the past split to hold their own 
conferences, as is evidenced by the Beijing Women's Conference. 
The UN Charter was recently amended by Article 71, to augment a 
formal relationship between NGOs and the United Nations. The UN 
recognises any group that "declares themselves as such according 
to existing national procedures" (as quoted in Brett,1995:96) as 
an NGO. Wiseberg suggests that what distinguishes a human rights 
NGO from any ot~er human rights org~nisation is that they not 
only seek human rights for their own members but for the society 
in general. Furthermore "a political group seeks to advance its 
own particular interests (a NGO) seeks to keep the political 
process open to all legitimate societal forces" (quoted in 
Brett,1995:97) . 
Paul Wapner believes that "transnational activists shape 
conditions which influence how their particular cause is 
. -~-
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addressed" (Wapner,1995:311) Organisations like Amnesty 
International have changed human rights practices in particular 
. " 
countries. He believes that these :organisations must be seen as 
political actors in their own right. The best way to look at 
transnational organisations is through the concept of ' world 
civic politics' (Wapner,1995:312). Civil society, according to 
.-- ~ 
Wapner's definition, is the area above the individual but below 
the state. 
It is a complex network of economic, social, and cultural 
practices based on friendship, family, the market, and 
voluntary affiliation (Wapner,1995:313). 
He believes that this concept can be used in the global sense, 
as it transcends national boundaries. When NGOs direct their 
actions beyond the state, they politicise the global civil 
society. 
Often, NGOs recognise that they are unable to challenge the state 
directly and therefore seek to influence actors in ciyil sgc'lety 
other than the government. The state is not ignored, rather 
other channels are explored as "unofficial realms of collective 
action" (Wapner,1995:314). International NGOs often target the 
state to further their aims, but when this fails they turn to 
alternative transnational organisations. Problems that transcend 
national boundaries, like that of refugees and environmental 
issues need to be tackled in this way so as to ensure protection 
at the global level. 
Scholars have argued that these organisations have had a marked 
effect on international problems. To sum up, the surge of 
transnational activity suggests that' the state might not most 
accurately explain world events (Wapner, 1995:317) . Wapner 
distances himself from the "either/or" debate, saying that one 
does not have to decide whether the state is still the number one 
actor in international affairs, or if the NGO is eclipsing its 
role. He is more interested in understanding certain political 
action, rather than "ranking" the effectiveness of different 
agents in this action. If this is to be done, scholars will 
recognise that NGOs make a significant contribution to world 
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affairs, not only because they influence the state, but because 
they also influence the "behaviolJr, of larger collectivities 
throughout the world" (Wapner, 1'995:320) . They do this by 
influencing the structures that govern global civil society. 
3.4. Strengths 
According to Sarah Tisch and Michael Wallace, the motivations of 
NGO's are primarily humanitarian. 
These organisations do not usually work in development to 
further the national interests of their home states, so '¥ 
do not fit realist explanations of state-based 
development organisations (Tisch and Wallace,1994:79). 
NGO's are established to do what governments cannot or will not 
do, to further the needs of the citizens in any particular 
country. They go further to point out that NGO's have a history 
of being in touch with the communities they§erve. This link is 
often established because NGO's have the opportunity of getting 
to know the people in that community and realise what kind of 
development is appropriate in that particular context. Because 
their aim is humanitarian and because of this link with the 
community, NGO's are often the best vehi'cles for providing 
socio-economic upliftment (Tisch and Wallace, 1994:80). 
Stamp uses the British NGO Oxfam as an example of an organisation 
that "does". She quotes the field directors handbook as saying 
that the main aim of Oxfam working abroad is to respond to the 
needs of those that are suffering most in the host country. The 
aim of the organisation is to alleviate the suffering of the 
poorest in any pociety. But it seeks to do so by giving those 
poorest members of society the opportunity to take charge of the 
process of improving their living standards. Oxfam's projects 
aim to ensure that the poor "have more" and that they "be more", 
in terms of their confidence and ability to take control of their 
own lives (Stamp, 1982:91). 
Some organisations may come to act as human rights NGOs at 
particular times, for example a doctors association may champion 
the rights of doctors not to become involved in the practice of 
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torture. Other organisations may become NGOs, whose role it is 
to "support the different local groups, but also advocate at the 
." "-
regional and international leveL on particular situations and 
issues" (Brett,1995:99). NGOs have come to function as the 
bridge between grass-roots practice and the institutions that are 
supposed to protect human rights. 
Historically NGOs have relied on interstate relations to allow 
channels of communication. They have now devised channels of 
their own which allow them more freedom and have, in effect, 
created their own diplomatic networks. Concerns that have 
previously been the sole realm of the state are now being 
influenced by NGOs. This .is partly due to the fact that they 
have. been able to garner expertise through their "economic, 
informational and intellectual resources" (Clark, 1995: 508) . 
Many NGOs can also claim legitimacy in terms of their popular 
support. Their impact on states is not a static phenomenon, but 
has changed over time and will continue to do so. 
On the level of human rights, NGOs have been responsible for 
strengthening the expectation that·' states be held responsible for 
their human rights practices. According to Clark these changes 
have arisen not so much from "enthusiastic state participat-ion 
as from international popular and diplomatic pressu~e exerted on 
governments" (Clark, 1995: 509) . Human rights fiGOs have been 
successful on two fronts, firstly by alerting the public as to 
human rights abuses and secondly by creating channels for their 
monitoring and eradicatiori. It is also through this kind of 
activity that new norms are formalised. 
Clark asks why NGOs are effective. NGO influence has grown 
because they are different from states: firstly because they can 
focus on a single issue while states have many functions to 
fulfil. Secondly, they often commit themselves to issues that 
states deem less important than the everyday running of that 
state. However, NGOs can draw on their grass-roots support to 
influence public opinion at the state level. 
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The involvement of domestic actors allows NGOs to bring 
pressure on states internally, based on domestic 
representation and legit~macy, as well as 
internationally, based on,f;umanitarian principles and 
generalised public opinion (Clark,1995:512). 
Thirdly, NGOs commi t themselves to their issues intensely. Their 
membership is less diverse on these issues than the citizens at 
the state level. Therefore the people worki~~· for the 
organisations are more devoted to their issue. 
Bernstein goes on to state that the government has been "short-
sighted" in its dealings with NGO's because, firstly, it was 
unable to spend its development budget because of delivery 
constraints, and secondly,~ because it is - not utilising the 
capac.ity of NGO's to deliver. If the state has decided that it 
has no confidence in the NGO's to deliver, asks Bernstein, why 
has any money at all been allocated to them __ Why do they not set 
up a totally new mechanism for dealing with the funds allocated 
.' 
to development? Bernstein believes that the NGO sector must 
"relentlessly push" the government for answers to these 
contradictions (Bernstein, 1994) . She says; 
SA is a richer, more effective, more democratic and more 
compassionate society because or the intricate network of 
organisations in the NGO sector. We must preserve this 
sector's innovation, pluralism, diversity and robust 
individualism (Bernstein, 19941 . 
Much of the writing on the strengths of NGOs, has posited that 
they are better able to perform their tasks if they use a 
people-centred development strategy. It is important at this 
juncture to explain what is meant by this kind of strategy. 
-' Korten summarises what is meant by' the term people-centred 
development with the following quote: 
Development is a process by which the members of a 
society increase their personal and institutional 
capacities to mobilise and manage resources to produce 
sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their 
quality of life consistent with their own aspirations 
(Korten,1990:67) . 
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This definition is contrary to that of the industrialisation 
development theories which hold that if there is growth in any 
gi ven country, i-t means that deve1ppmemt has taken place. Micro 
theories of development emphasise the process of development and 
holds to be true principles of "justice, sustainability and 
inclusiveness" (Korten, 1990: 68). It further points out that only 
people themselves can define what improvements to-their lives 
are. The theory posits that people have to be empowered in 
their own environments and thereby will take responsibility for 
their own lives. 
Katarina Tomasevski points out that development aid is different 
from foreign aid, as its main aim is to provide sustainable 
development. She claims that governments are still the main 
actors in aid, but they are no longer the only ones. Donors have 
increasingly been giving aid directly to_N~Q's. She sites the 
data on ODA; in the early 80s 5% of the aid was delivered by 
NGO's and by 1985 this figure had grown to 10% (T9ma~ev'ski, 
1989:111). She believes that this has taken place for the same 
reasons as Bernstein does; donors prefer NGOs because of their 
"recognised ability" to reach local communit:tes and access those 
that really need assistance, and because NGOs are known to be 
able to carry out development projects with less funding.-One 
must not neglect the fact that often NGO projects receive much 
media attention, and this is also a reason for their increased 
access to development aid (Tomasevski,1989:111) 
There are two theoretical views on development and human rights 
NGOs. The first is that development can never be depoliticised. 
Real development means that people become empowered and begin to 
make their own decisions on what is best for their own 
situations. The second view endorses that human rights is in the 
realm of exposing abuses of power, while development is succinct 
from this; providing economic upliftment. This can provide a 
political difficulty. Aid is therefore often granted to those 
organisations that do not challenge the authorities of the day 
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(Tomasevski,1989:114). Unless, of-course, those that grant the 
aid have as their aims the down fall of that particular state. 
3.5. What are their limitations? 
One of the limitations of NGO action is that governments are the 
-~ ~ 
only actors that can ensure that international conventions, as 
well as domestic law, are carried out. NGOs can attempt to 
persuade governments to provide these rights, but ultimately they 
cannot force them to ensure the rights, nor can they improve the 
situation themselves. Development NGOs are more able to ensure 
the latter, but in this instance resources play an important 
role. 
"Organisations can either be viewed as a th::t:'eat to an existing 
government system and labelled as subversj.:ve or they can be 
viewed as a useful watchdog and an activating and motivating 
force within society" (as quoted in Brett, 1995: 108) . Willets 
agrees that political power is measured in the ability to 
mobilise legitimacy. He believes some NGOs, like Amnesty 
International, have more political power than any given 
government. They derive this power from their high international 
status and from the morally acceptable policies theY-ctre 
pursuing. NGOs are rarely cited as the reason that governments 
embark on policy change. However, when government's listen to the 
recommendations of NGOs, this is a measure of their respect for 
that NGO. As is the request from government for these 
recommendations (Brett,1995:109). Bernstein does caution us not 
to use the termNGO as interchangeable with civil society, it can 
not speak for society in general. She goes on to point out that 
what works in one small community may not work as a national 
policy for poverty alleviation. I would argue that such a 
blanket policy is not necessary. If it is possible to go into 
every small community through the NGO network and get to know 
that community and its specific needs, then there will be no need 
for national development plans, other than a budgeting and 
networking department to ensure that there is no duplication. 
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NGO's limitations include the fact that they often remain small 
and their research is often limited, as are their dissemination 
capabilities. Also, as they grow thEde is a lack of coordination 
"< 
and inter-NGO communication. There is a tendency for" ... proj ects 
to remain very local and rarely address wider structural factors 
that underlie rural poverty" (Bebbington and Farrington, 
1993:209). NGO work could be enhanced if access Eb~technical 
services were enhanced and if there was more inter-organisational 
cooperation. 
3.6. Conclusion 
It is therefore the contention of this thesis that NGOs have 
strengths that governments do not. They have strong links to 
people living in the situations that they aim to improve. They 
have further links with one another to imEroy§ their own skills. 
They are usually committed to single issues, those that are most 
pertinent at any given time. They do not work towards p~:r::s>bnal 
gain in the form of garnering votes in their "constituencies". 
NGOs are established to perform the tasks that governments often 
cannot or will not do. Most importantly, they are equipped to 
perform the goals that they set out for themselves, and those 
that governments fail to achieve. 
Operation Hunger 
4.1. Overview 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
This chapter is a review of the history of Operation'Hunger as 
a South African non-governmental organisation that has been 
involved in food security issues for about 15 years. The 
organisation has, over the years, changed its focus, eventually 
coming to rest with the idea of a more holistic idea of 
development. This concept of development was reworked by 
Operation Hunger staff themselves and named the "integrated 
development programme" (Annual Report, 1995/6). In terms of this 
the organisation hoped to move away from broad-based feeding and 
move in line with the RDP and micro theories of development. 
Operation Hunger does its best to work with a number offion-
governmental organisations and the state to ensure participation 
in broad-based development (Food for Thought,1995:9). This, of-
course, was not true of the dealings with the state during the 
Apartheid era. Shelver believes that OH was very unpopular with 
the government (Interview 3). This was extended to a ridiculous 
extent when a Conservative Party MP accused OH of paying for 
Winnie Mandela's cosmetic surgery at a time when the ANC was the 
government's prime enemy (The Citizen, 10.03.93). Later, in 1991, 
when then Minister of Health, Dr Rina Venter established her 
feeding fund, the old frictions with the government arose again. 
The government's main obj ection to OH' s application for funds was 
.. 
that it intended to allocate funds only on a regional leve~, and 
OH had applied on a national level. Operation Hunger was not 
willing to apply on a regional level, because they believed that 
this reinforced the Homeland system (Perlman, 15 .10.92) . OH 
eventually received funding from the regional Department of 
Health (National Nutrition and Social Development) in 1994 and 
this allowed OH to feed until the PSNP was introduced. After 
this, funding for feeding was restricted to community or pre-
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school programmes (Shelver, Interview 3) . 
It is extremely_difficult to caPs~re the vitality and tenacity 
of this organisation, its history spanning almost two decades but 
I hope to do justice to the people involved in Operation Hunger 
in this chapter, in explaining just how they attack hunger and 
malnutrition in South Africa. 4 
4.2. The History of Operation Hunger 
Operation Hunger's mission statement reads thus: 
Operation Hunger creates partnerships between vulnerable 
people to combat malnutrition, which when suffered by 
children, undermines the Nation's Health, Education and 
Economic Potential (OH, Annual Report 1995/6). 
This mission has not always been implemented in the same fashion, 
and it is important to investigate how_ tge organisation has 
developed over the years, in response to the changes that have 
occurred in South Africa and to an internal review proce~~lhat 
indicated they were not fulfilling their self-appointed role. 
The mission contained in the current annual report is, in fact, 
only two years old. Before this, there was no formally declared 
mission statement. The organisation's main objectives were two-
fold; in the short-term to provide hunger relief through feeding 
schemes, and in the long-term to establish self-he-J..p projects (OH 
Annual Report,August 1980-March 1982). The organisations that 
OH formed partnerships with was, and continues to be, widely 
based and include other NGOs, development organisations, funding 
partners, the cgrporate sector, private individuals, communities 
and, latterly, the government (Shelver, Interview 3) . 
Prior to 1994 those that became recipients of OH aid referred to 
4Much of the information contained in this chapter was 
gained from a number of interviews with Operation Hunger staff 
and volunteers involved in work in the actual communities. This 
relationship is based on a number of visits that I undertook as 
a journalist for a news agency. 
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any one individual, family, pre - school, primary- school, grouping 
within a community (eg. TB patient~)~or the whole community who 
felt that they needed food support. At that stage, nutritional 
vulnerability applied to hunger, and not nutritional status as 
it does today. OH's self-appointed mandate in the Apartheid era 
was to provide vulnerable people with services th~t~the state 
would not provide them with. At this stage, because of a number 
of circumstances, for example forced removals and the poor state 
of affairs in the homelands and townships, the main problem that 
OH faced was the provision of food to millions of starving 
people. A review process revealed that this kind of broad-based 
feeding did not address the root of the problems that most South 
Africans faced every day. This review process'will be discussed 
more .fully later in the thesis. 
Operation Hunger was established in response to probably the 
worst drought in South African history under the auspices of~the 
Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR).5 The organisation was led 
for almost 12 years by executive director Ina Perlman, who had 
seen the abject poverty in which most Africans lived during her 
work for the SAIRR. As it grew, offices were established in 
Johannesburg, and later in East London. The East London office 
grew out of necessity with the independence of the Ciskei, and 
the South African state's unwillingness to deal with its poverty. 
Eventually there were offices in almost every main city in South 
Africa, covering most regions. 
4.3. Funding 
5The institute was founded in 1929 and the two main 
objectives of its constitution were as follows: 
n(a) To work for peace, goodwill and practical co-
operation between the various sections of the 
populations of South Africa. 
(b) To initiate, support, assist and encourage 
investigations that may lead to greater knowledge 
and understanding of the racial groups and of the 
relations that subsist or should subsist between fum' 
(Hellmann, 1979:4) . 
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Fundraising, considering the amount of people OH was feeding 
every day in South Africa, was >_a~ways problematic for the 
organisation. -In 1986 OH start<ed its Gold Rush fundraising 
campaign and, before the era of the scratch card, this was 
extremely lucrative. Gold Rush was a lottery type competition. 
In the beginning it was very successful, but wg!=I1 a quiz, 
televised to finalise the end of the Gold Rush 2 competition, was 
badly bungled, the image of the competition was damaged. 
Nevertheless, it was still ~n extremely good earner for OH. In 
total there were 15 Gold Rush competitions, the last one ending 
in 1994. Each competition was launched with a large event and 
ended with one, always very glamorous, and obviously meant to 
serve as a contrapuntal picture to the face of hunger (The 
Star,-22. 08.88). One of the most important features of Gold Rush 
was that it produced money for unspecified use, like 
administrative costs, which donors are often reluctant to fund 
(Shelver, Interview 3) . 
One of the main problems with broad-based feeding is that it is 
expensive. The budget for the Eastern Cape was over one million 
rand a month, feeding approximately 150 to 300 thousand people. 
There were nine other regions in South Africa with similar 
budgets (Annual Report, 1992/3) .At the time that OH began its 
programme evaluation most NGOs in South Africa faced a funding 
crisis. Before Apartheid began to disintegrate and the "newly 
elected government was in place the burden of development fell 
on the fragmented shoulders of a multitude of community-
orientated NGOs" (23.07.93). These NGOs had to look to outsiders 
for funding, beeause their work was ~~ually contrary to that of 
the Apartheid state. With the implementation of the RDP, the 
NGOs have been stripped of their original function. NGOs have 
been invited to work alongside and together with the new 
dispensation, but are suspicious, by their nature, of government 
and believe their strength lies in their independence. To 
recei ve funding from the government would turn these 
organisations into parastatals (Daily Dispatch,23.07.93). 
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Gavin Stewart, Editor of the Daily Dispatch, backs this view. 
He points out that during the Apartheid years a special kind of 
",- , 
NGO multiplied - in South Africa., Because the whole world 
supported their cause they were able to collect substantial 
amounts of money. By one estimate the NGO sector collected 
R1 000 million a year and employed 2 million workers. A 
.- - ~ 
considerable slice of this money came from foreign governments. 
"Now that the noble cause has been won and the world sees a 
government that can do no wrong, money for good causes is much 
more difficult to find" (Daily Dispatch, 25.11.94). In 1994 the 
European Union donated R440 million to South Africa, all of this 
was channelled through the RDP. Those NGOs that in the past had 
depended on European governments for fundirrg,' had to depend on 
the government of South Africa. The EU's decision "will take 
some power from the people and give more to the government, (and) 
... as experience should have taught us, ~hey are not the same 
thing" (Daily Dispatch,25.11.94). 
In 1993, Operation Hunger underwent a review process, to assess 
the impact of the feeding that had been taking place. It seemed 
that there was no end in sight for broad-based feeding. 6 At one 
stage Operation Hunger was feeding two million people a day 
(Annual Report,1992-1993). The feeding schemes had grown beyond 
all manageable proportions. The organisation began to ask 
pertinent questions about itself in terms of the 'real impact it 
was making in South Africa. Were they feeding the right people? 
Was the food that they were supplying sufficiently nutritious 
that it made an impact? Was the food reaching the people 
continually? 
What Operation Hunger had managed to do was to gain itself a 
favourable reputation as being able to communicate with 
communities at the grass roots level. In a statement to the 
Press in 1991, the British Embassy justified its' funding to 
6This term means that there is no nutritional research or 
targeting conducted, but rather that any person or group that 
seeks for help is given food. 
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Operation Hunger by saying that the organisation: 
... delivers practical assistauc~ to the poorest of the par 
in South Africa. Last year,tpey fed 1.4 million p e 0 pIe 
across this country. In our experience it has also proved 
most effective in promoting community development in rural 
areas ... (as quoted in The Citizen,14.02.91). 
The review process in the Eastern Cape began from the point of 
view that it was one of the most impoverished and underdeveloped 
regions in the country. 
4.4. Operation Hunger - Eastern Cape 
Operation Hunger quotes the following statistics from the 
Development Bank of South Africa to illustrate its point. 
Population (1993) 
Population growth 
Unemployment 
Personal Annual income 
Life expectancy 
Human development index 
Infant mortality 
6 665 400 
2,6% 
23,6% 
R1 358 
59,6 years 
0.48%7 
58.2 per 1 OOO·infants 
(Operation Hunger Report,1994:3) 
The area that Operation Hupger provides to in the Eastern Cape 
includes the former Transkei and Ciskei, the' region known 
formerly as the Eastern Cape, Border and the Karoo. It has been 
feeding in the region since 1986, and in late 1993 was feeding 
approximately 500 000 people (Operation Hunger Report,1995:4). 
After the review process was concluded in the Eastern Cape, the 
report stated: 
A development approach is required to address the 
problem of long-term nutritional vulnerability. Such a 
development strategy must consider a wide range of 
7 This indicator is used by the UN as a development 
programme measure based on life expectancy, adult literacy and 
income. It has a maximum index of 1.0 
61 
factors that undermine household health. These would 
include issues of food security, access to clean water, 
sanitation, a healthy environment, and appropriate child 
and maternal care (Operatiolli Hunger Report,1995:4). 
It was further concluded that the mere delivery of food may not 
address the root cause of food insecurity. The fundamental 
causes of the crisis situation in South Africa at the time can 
be put down to, "redundancies in the mines employing rural 
workers, overcrowding, overgrazing, deforestation and a general 
lack of development" (Sowetan, 19.07.91). One must at this stage 
take into account the fact that the people of the Eastern Cape, 
especially those living in the former homelands fell prey to 
these circumstance because of the policies of .Apartheid and the 
unwillingness of the former government to provide basic services. 
A more holistic strategy was therefore needed to enhance the 
household's ability to acquire food. In late~994 OH (nationally) 
started a process of referring old feeding scheme locales to 
other organisations involved in feeding. 
It was intended that any feeding done by Operation Hunger in the 
future would be done at sites where the new development strategy 
was being employed. Feeding would be strictly targeted to 
children in the 0-6 age group (who would receive at least two-
thirds of their nutritional RDA) , lactating mothers and those on 
TB medication. These target groups are the mos~ nutritionally 
vulnerable, because: 
(a) Up to the age of six the human body needs a multiplicity of 
nutrients essenSial for the spurt of growth experienced in this 
age group. 
(b) Lactating mothers need nutritional supplement because many 
of their vital nutrients leave the body during breast-feeding. 
(c) Tuberculosis medication induces vomiting if taken on any 
empty stomach. 
All current projects will be assessed in terms of their 
sustainability, meaning that the community will eventually take 
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ownership of the proj ects themselves. OH will on this basis 
decide whether it should continue its support of these projects . 
. - " 
In 1994, OH (Eastern Cape) was asked if it would run a number of 
soup kitchens in the Port Elizabeth area under the auspices of 
the National Nutrition and Social Development Programme (NNSDP). 
The beneficiaries of this scheme would be those wnd were not 
attending pre-school or creche in the 0-6 years age category. 
Using its grass roots links with previous feeding sites, OH 
embarked on a process of identifying those most in need of 
support. Informal settlement areas were chosen and by the end 
of December 1994, 30 soup kitchens existed. By September 1995 
there were 44, which meant that Operation Hunger was feeding 14 
798 people in the area a day (Shelver,1995:1). These kitchens 
operated mainly out of community member's own kitchens and were 
open Mondays to Fridays. OH ensured that the food was promptly 
-
delivered and a food parcel incentive was offered to people who 
helped in the kitchens (Shelver,Interview 1). 
The NNSDP began to insist that targeting be controlled more 
strictly and it was decided that t-here be more emphasis on women 
in the rural areas. The decision began to take effect during 
South Africa's transition to democracy, while var-ious 
stakeholders were at the negotiating table and once there was a 
general consensus that the reigns of power would'be handed over 
to those that had been democratically chosen to govern. The ANC 
had released a working document, the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) , that it would use as a guideline to 
address the imb~lances that had been created by Apartheid. Most 
organisations and government departments, as well as the 
corporate sector, quickly brought themselves in line with the 
policy programme. By the time the Government of National Unity 
took power, with the ANC at its helm, the RDP policy document was 
being consulted so as to give direction to most development 
programmes. 
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The RDP subscribed to a vision of development that was holistic 
and inclusive, and emphasised that tpose that had previously been 
. ,-
left out of the Apartheid state's development agenda, be 
consciously included. One of its main visions is the advancement 
of the needs of rural women, stating: 
The role of women within the RDP requires. - E1articular 
emphasis. Women are the majority of the poor in South 
Africa. Mechanisms to address the disempowerment of women 
and boost their role within the development process and 
economy must be implemented. The RDP must recognise and 
address existing gender inequalities as they affect 
access to jobs, land, housing etc (RDP,1994). 
Operation Hunger's Eastern Cape pilot site, Tamboville, provides 
greater insight into OH's method of operation: 
4.5. Tamboville - OH's Eastern Cape pilot site 
Tamboville, or Tambo as it is known to the-vi~~agers, is situated 
just outside Wittlesea, close to Queenstown. 
The land that the villagers are living on now was Tribal-Trust 
Land. They have recently been awarded the rights to the land on 
which they are living, and are negotiating ownership on the other 
side of the national road, as the village is contained by its 
size. The village is divided into 779 plots, which are 50 x 50 
m in size. At first Tambo had 6 communal toilets and 2 communal 
water taps. Most of the homes have been electrified. In order 
to gain ownership of a piece of land in Tambo, one has to go 
through an application process, and the criterion for winning 
such an application is the ownership of some kind of raw 
materials for building a structure. There is an executive 
committee in the village, that interestingly has only two men on 
-' 
it (Operation Hunger Report,1995:10). 
When the people first moved into Tambo in 1991, they approached 
Operation Hunger, partly because they come from such diverse 
backgrounds i some come from the former Transkei, others come from 
the surrounding villages, to start a community feeding scheme at 
the informal pre-school. This was done just after the first 
people starting moving there in 1991. 70,3% of the people living 
in Tambo were 
Report,1995:61) . 
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recipients of food (Operation Hunger 
Tambo presented a very unique opportunity for 
...- '-
Operation Hunger to tryout its' new programmes and it became the 
Eastern Cape's pilot study. 
Operation Hunger was very fortunate in that there were a number 
...- - ~ 
of other role players who participated in its Tamboville proj ect. 
For example; The Independent Development Trust (IDT) and Cape 
Provincial Administration (CPA) conducted the water programme. 
This meant that OH could concentrate on health and nutritional 
programmes, as well as a certain measure of income generation. 
Operation Hunger started off with a an intensive assessment 
programme which was quantitative in its natur·e. This fed into 
a sample questionnaire, going on to focus discussions and various 
other participative methodologies, to try and get the villager's 
view of themselves. This was also done tO~ctsses whether Tambo 
would indeed be an appropriate site for Operation Hung.e=r's 
testing of their new development strategies. 
There are two Operation Hunger fieldworkers living just outside 
f 
" 
the village, one of whom is a registered nurse and social worker. 
These fieldworkers and Ms Shelver believe that the community has 
accepted them, mainly because they have been committed to-the 
community for almost two years. But they have always foreseen 
that they would gradua.lly withdraw from Tambo, as they people 
become more equipped to take the projects over by themselves. 
For Shelver, staying in the community for ever would certainly 
not mean development has occurred. The participative methodology 
used by Operat-"ion Hunger in drawing conclusions about the 
.' 
community at Tambo, reflects an attitude that the organisation 
takes seriously the opinions and needs of that community and this 
helps to ensure a projects' sustainability, because there is a 
real sense of ownership by the people that the project aims to 
serve. 
The fieldworkers see as one of their best achievements the 
setting up of the nutrition unit. They have been training members 
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of the community to survey the nutritional status of the children 
in that community. The Department of Health backs them up in 
" this aim, trying to move away from. mere feeding schemes to more 
integrated developmental nutritional programmes. Operation 
Hunger has found that often if there is no food provided for 
children in the school setting, the parents will not send their 
r __ 
children to school. Once Operation Hunger stopped broad-based 
feeding at the schools in Tambo, the old Ciskei government gave 
food parcels to the community on an ir~egular monthly basis. When 
the food was finished the mothers did not send their children to 
the pre-school any more. Shelver believes that this is not a 
unique experience (Interview 1). The fieldworkers have moved 
away from Tambo and the programmes seem to working on their own. 
The community health workers who were trained by Operation Hunger 
are continuing with their nutritional surveillance and education 
around malnutrition and disease. The garden-which was starte~ 
adj acent to the unit has not yielded much in terms of crops 
because of the lack of water. It is hoped that with the .spring 
rains the women working in the unit will be able to gain more 
from the garden. The b:cick-making, and fence-making, to a lesser 
degree, projects are continuing s~ccessfully, with the workers 
now drawing profits (Ms Nombulelo Moss, Interview 5) . 
4.6. What do the people of Tambo need? 
In 1994 Operation Hunger fieldworkers reported that an 
overwhelming number (1:4) of the children in Tambo were stunted 
(Operation Hunger Report, 1995: 62) . In the Eastern Cape as a 
whole, the resliJts of anthropometric testing (that was part of 
-' 
the Operation Hunger's internal review process) showed that, the 
previous 11 years of broad-based feeding had no impact at all on 
the nutritional status of the children, who had been recipients 
of OH food aid (Annual Report, 1994-1995) . 8 
8According to the data collected by OH staff, 25% of 
children under the age of six years at Tambo, fell below the 3rd 
centile height/weight for age (Shelver,interview 3) .There are 
basically three categories of nutritional status. The first and 
second categories, falling between the 50th and 97th centiles, 
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Once OH had collated this data and went back to the community 
with what they had found, there seemed to be fairly total 
.- " 
acceptance of it. The villagers admitted freely that they were 
too poor to provide their children with the food that was 
necessary to ensure that they remained heal thy. The people 
living in Tambo perceived the following to be the means to combat 
..- - ~ 
poverty; "gardens, so that they could sell vegetables, sewing, 
brick-making, poultry, fencing, and pig breeding" (Operation 
Hunger Report,1995:49) Operation Hunger therefore embarked on 
a process of implementing the programmes that the community saw 
as beneficial to them. 
The point to be made is a simple one. Operation Hunger had been 
involved in feeding similar to that which the PSNP has recently 
embarked upon, for 11 years. Once they evaluated their 
programme they realised that broad-based feeding had no 
nutritional impact. They realised further that the root cause 
of this nutritional vulnerability was complex. The lack of; 
sanitation, access to jobs, land and water and a host of other 
social services, are to blame for these villager's, and other 
South Africans like them, inability to provide sufficiently 
nutritious meals for their children. 
4.7. Conclusion 
It is nothing short of ludicrous to assume 
a peanut-butter sandwich could alleviate 
people of Tamboville find themselves 
that the provision of 
the plight which the 
in. However, were 
organisations ~ike Operation Hunger, or indeed the government, 
in a village like Tambo, would include those children that have 
no problems with malnutrition and it means that their 
weight:height:age ratios are in proportion. Falling below the 
50th centile denotes danger, and means that there has to be some 
kind of nutritional intervention, but it is not life-threatening 
at this stage. If a child begins to fall below the third centile 
mark it probably means that the child is either ill or is 
stunted. It is the ideal to hope that only 3% of any given 
population fall below this mark (Department of Health, Road to 
Health card: issued at all South African clinics) . 
67 
to provide sanitation, water pumps; brick-making utensils, 
vegetable seeds and education and support around nutritional 
. " 
issues, as they- have done in Tambo, nutritional vulnerability 
could properly be addressed. 
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Table 1: Reflecting Operation Hunger's Feeding 
Figures 1980-1995 " 
Fed Fed Money 
Year Nationally Regionally Collected 
1980 - 1982 50 000 R~ 230 811 
1982 - 1983 500 000 R 1 800 000 
1983 - 1984 600 000 106 573 R 3 000 000 
1984 - 1985 652 000 R 5 036 884 
1985 - 1986 957 000 R 5 432 469 
1986 - 1987 1 000 000 405 395 R12 866 591 
1987 - 1988 1 300 000 451 914 R14 600 000 
-
- '-
-
1988 - 1989 1 350 000 357 685 R15 596 671 
.' 
'.' 
1989 - 1990 1 396 041 381 977 R16 521 237 
1990 - 1991 1 391 910 446 270 R18 106 845 
1991 - 1992 1 848 509 420 467 R30 579 243 
1992 -1993 2 407 642 712 351 R34 876 84-6 . 
1993 - 1994 400 000 R35 881 428 
1994 - 1995 4 180 344 400 000 R35 703 840 
Note: The figures above are collected from the annual reports 
of Operation Hunger and from The Star (22.12.90). Some figures 
are unavailabl~ for some years. The table is intended to show 
the sporadic increase and decrease' in the amount of people 
Operation Hunger was feeding at anyone time. 
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Conclusion 
The fact that children have received food in the Eastern Cape, 
would mean, by some definitions, that development has taken 
place. However, there are a number of questions which remain 
...- - ~ 
unanswered. It is the contention of this thesis the problems of 
nutrition and education, and development on the whole, can better 
be addressed by NGOs active at the grass roots level. This 
contention is held because of the more general belief that NGOs 
develop for development's sake and governments develop so that 
they gain the favour of their constituents. 
Thernost pertinent insights offered by the theories studied in 
this thesis, are advanced by the Public Choice, Marxist and 
Weberian schools. For the Public Choice oCBool of thought, the 
PSNP failed because the government was acting in its own 
interest, in a bid to ensure re-election. Marxists woUld 'answer 
that the programme was not in the interests of the ruling class 
and that this means a lack of commitment to the programme on the 
part of the government. For the Weberian school of thought, it 
is imaterial that the government could have been acting in its 
own interests in implementing the P~NP, the fact is that it-did 
function autonomously. All of these theories offer important 
points as to the fact that the government was acting in its own 
interest when it implemented the PSNP. 
It is the contention of this thesis that NGOs have strengths that 
governments do not. The most importaIl,t of these strengths is the 
fact that they do not work towards personal gain in the form of 
garnering votes in their "constituencies". NGOs are established 
to perform the tasks that governments often cannot or will not 
do. Most importantly, they are equipped to perform the goals 
that ~hey set for themselves, and those that governments often 
fail to achieve. 
It is clear that the PSNP was not implemented according to its 
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blueprint. Ultimately, the PSNP brought sandwiches to primary 
school children, but did little to en~ure real empowerment in the 
communities. This kind of programme can never alleviate the 
plight which the people of Tamboville, or any other community in 
South Africa, find themselves in. However, a more holistic 
concept of development could ensure that people become more 
involved in their own development and that means that nutritional 
vulnerability could properly be addressed. 
71 
Bibliography 
Books: 
Bertramsen, R. B., Thomsen, J. P. F. & Torfing, J. 1991 State Economy 
and Society, Unwin Hyman Limited: London 
Ferguson, Y.H. & Mansbach,R.W. 1989 The State, Conceptual Chaos, 
and the Future of International Relations Theory, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers: Colorado. 
Hellmann, E. 1979. The South African Institute of Race Relations: 
A short history, SAIRR:Johannesburg. 
,." 
Korten,D.C. 1990. Getting into the Twenty-first Century: 
Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda, Kumarian Press: 
Connecticut. 
Lipton,M. & Simkins,C. 1993 State and Market in Post Apartpeid 
South Africa, Witwatersrand University Press: Johannesburg. 
Miliband,R. 1977. Marxism and Politics, Oxford University 
Press: London. 
Nordlinger,E.A. 1987. "Taking the State Seriously" in 
Understanding Political Development, ,.Little, Brown and Company: 
Boston. 
Przeworski,A and Wallerstein,M. 1988. "Structural Dependence 
of the State on Capital" in American Political Science Review, 
Vol 82, No.1, March. 
Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1994: Issued by the 
African National Congress: Johannesburg. 
72 
Tisch,S & Wallace,M. 1994. Dilemmas of Development Assistance: 
The What, Why and Who of Foreign Aid, Westview Press:US. 
. " 
Tomasevski,K. 1989. Development Aid and Human Rights, Pinter 
Publishers Limited:UK. 
Willets,P. 1982. Pressure Groups in the Global System, 
Frances Pinter Publishers Limited: London. 
Periodicals: 
Amner,R. 1995. "Food for Thought in Fraud" in Leading Edge, 
October, journal of the Independent Development Trust. 
Amner, R. 1995. "Out to Lunch?" in Democracy in Action. 
Bebbington,A. 
Agricultural 
and Farrington,J. 1993. "Governments, NGOs and 
Development: Perspectives on Changing -Intr-
Organisational Relationships" in Journal of Development Studies, 
Vol.29, No.2. 
Brett, R. 1995. "The Role and Limics of Human Rights NGOs at 
the United Nations" in Political Studies, Volume 43, Speclal 
Issue. 
Clark, A-M. 1995. "Non-Governmental Organisations and their 
Influence on International Society" in Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol 48, No.2. 
"Food for Thought: Operation Hunger Development Update", 
Quarterly Review, October 1995, Number One. 
Le Grand, J. 1991 "The Theory of Government Failure" in The 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol 21, Part 4, October. 
Wapner,P. 1995. "Politics beyond the State: Environmental 
Activism and World Civic Politics" in World Politics Volume 47, 
73 
April. 
Documents: 
Breslin, E., 1994, "Rethinking Relief: Operation Hunger and 
Nutritional Vulnerability in South Africa", Paper presented at 
~ - ~ 
Southern African Nutrition Congress. 
Department of Health, 1993. Road to Health Chart. Issued at all 
Department of Health clinics in South Africa. 
Eastern Cape RDP Standing Committee Report on the Recommendations 
of the Technical Task Team to the PSNP, September 1995. 
Joint Health and Education Ministries, ~.a.95., Provincial 
Legislature Press Release. 
National Educare Forum, Report on the Implementation 6f the 
Primary School Nutrition Programme in Region D - Covering Period 
from 2nd September 1996 to 27 September 1996. 
"National Policy framework and Operational Guidelines", Fourth 
Draft, 1995.08.15. 
Operation Hunger, Annual Reports, 1980/82 - 1995/6 
Perlman, I. Let ter to the Department of Health, 15.10.92, 
Operation Hunger Archives. 
Shel ver , S . , 
Elizabeth: 
1995. "A 
Malnutrition 
Operation Hunger. 
Review 
in an 
of Feeding Schemes in' Port 
Urban Context" prepared for 
Shelver, S. 1995. "Operation Hunger Report: Eastern Cape Region 
Mpuma Koloni: Assessment and Planning" 
Interviews: 
Mr Kulekile Bata, 
Ms Christine Gush, 
Mr Irwin Friedman, 
Ms Nombulelo Moss, 
Interview 
Interview 
Interview 
Interview 
Interview 
74 
I, 
2, 
I, 
I, 
5, 
March 1996 
Ootober 1996 
October 1996 
March 1996 
March 1996 
Ms Sheelagh Shelver, Interview I, March 1996 
Interview 2, April 1996 
Interview 3, October 1996 
Mr Terreblanche, Interview I, November 1996 
Mr Vernon Weitz, Interview I, November 1996. 
Newspapers: 
Business Day, 23.9.92 
Bernstein,A. 2 June 1995, "Non-governmental organisations need 
to be empowered" in Business Day 
City Press, 6.8.95 
Citizen, 14.02.91 
23.9.92 
10.03.93 
Daily Dispatch, 27.03.93 
24.11. 94 
15.8.95 
15.10.96 
Eastern Province Herald, 28.11.91 
Saturday Star, 12.8.95 
Sowetan, 19.07.93 
Star, 25.9.92 
22.08.88 
Weekend Post, 23.11.91 
5.1. 92 
18.9.96 
10.10.96 
22.10.96 
75 
Weekly Mail and Guardian, 5.6.92 
4-10.8.95 
" 15-21. 3:. ~6. 
